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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the August 12, 1985, final judgment 
entered by Judge Frederick of the Third Judicial District Court 
In And For Salt Lake County, State Of Utah, wherein Judge 
Frederick failed to include a twenty seven thousand dollar 
($27,000) default amount in the damages awarded to Plaintiff/-
Appellant, DALVIN J. WILLIAMS (hereinafter referred to as 
WILLIAMS), in the legal malpractice action against Defendant/-
Respondent, JAMES N. BARBER (hereinafter referred to as BARBER). 
Judge Frederick excluded this default amount on the basis that no 
evidence of "meritorious claim" was presented at the trial held 
to determine the amount of damages to be awarded after liability 
had already been established by the October 11, 1983 Order 
granting partial summary judgment against BARBER as to any and 
all issued relating to liability. A finding of "meritorious 
claim" is an element of liability in legal malpractice actions 
and the Order granting partial summary judgment as to liability 
disposed of this element in the instant case. Therefore, the 
twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default amount entered 
against WILLIAMS as a result of the negligence of BARBER should 
have been included in the damages awarded to WILLIAMS. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about December 15, 1980, WILLIAMS was served with 
a Summons and Complaint in civil action number C-80-8309 filed in 
the Third Judicial District Court In And For Salt Lake County, 
State Of Utah, brought by C. Grant Morrison and Bonny Bruce to 
recover the principal sum of twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) 
for an alleged breach of contract. (See page 98 of the record.) 
On or about January 2, 1981, and pursuant to correspon-
dence dated December 29, 1980, BARBER was retained as WILLIAMS' 
attorney to file an Ansv/er in civil action number C-80-8309 and 
to otherwise represent WILLIAMS in that matter. (See pages 49, 50 
and 98 of the record.) 
BARBER accepted the retainer of five hundred dollars 
($500.00) and agreed to defend WILLIAMS in civil action C-80-
8309. In so doing, BARBER had a duty to interpose an Answer and 
to otherwise represent WILLIAMS in civil action C-80-8309. (See 
pages 98 and ""99 of the record.) 
BARBER negligently failed to interpose a timely Answer 
on WILLIAMS' behalf in civil action C-80-8309 and, by reason 
thereof, a default judgment amounting to approximately twenty 
seven thousand dollars ($27,000) was entered against WILLIAMS on 
or about March 16, 1981. (See pages 99 and 100 of the record.) 
Following the entry of said default judgment against WILLIAMS, 
WILLIAMS suffered levies upon his salary, loss of employment, 
loss of his home, bankruptcy, and incurred substantial expenses 
in attempting, in vain, to have said default judgment vacated a 
set aside. (See pages 100 through 102 of the record.) 
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Inasmuch as a valid defense could have been entered on 
WILLIAMS' behalf in civil action C-80-8309 and due to BARBER'S 
failure to file a timely answer or otherwise assert any defense 
in WILLIAMS' behalf, the twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) 
default judgment would not have been entered against WILLIAMS but 
for the negligence of BARBER. (See pages 38, 99 and 100 of the 
record.) Hence, the amount of the default judgment and the 
expenses incurred in attempting to set aside the default judgment 
were proximately caused by the negligence of BARBER. 
On or about August 10, 1983, WILLIAMS filed a Motion 
For Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability in this 
matter. (See pages 25 through 56 of the record.) Attached to 
that Motion For Partial Summary Judgment was a copy of the Martin 
Becker deposition transcript. At page 6 of the deposition 
transcript (page 38 of the record) attorney Martin Becker asserts 
that the underlying case (civil action C-80-8309) was defensible. 
In a letter* of December 29, 1980 to BARBER, attorney Martin 
Becker explained to BARBER that the lawsuit brought against 
WILLIAMS was defensible and, at a minimum, subject to various 
set-offs. This letter was also attached in its entirety to 
WILLIAMS' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of 
liability and appears at pages 4 9 and 5 0 of the record. 
On or about October 11, 1983, Judge Frederick granted 
summary judgment in favor of WILLIAMS on the issue of liability 
and signed an Order to that effect. (See pages 57 thorough 59 of 
the record.) Therefore, this matter proceeded to trial solely to 
ascertain the amount of damages to be awarded to WILLIAMS. 
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1] On or about May 14, 1985, trial on the issue of the 
2 I amount of damages to be awarded was held and final judgment was 
i 
3 |j entered on or about August 12, 1985. A transcript of the trial 
4 appears at pages 112 through 252 of the record while said final 
5 jj judgment appears at pages 105 and 106 of the record. While the 
final judgment awarded expenses incurred in attempting to have 
the default judgment vacated and set aside, it failed to award 
damages for the twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default 
judgment suffered by WILLIAMS as a result of the negligence of 
BARBER. Therefore, this appeal is from the August 12, 1985 
judgment as to damages. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A finding of "meritorious claim" is an element of 
liability in legal malpractice actions. While Utah, in the past, 
appears to have placed the burden of proof on this element upon 
the Plaintiff, the emerging contemporary approach now shifts the 
burden of proof to the defendant attorney as t i i h< issue of 
"meritorious claim". In any event, however, the issue of "mer-
itorious claim" is an element of liability in legal malpractice 
actions and any judgment as i o liability resolves the issue of 
"meritorious claim". 
The October 11, 1983 Order granting partial summary 
judgment as to "all issues relating to . liability" thus 
disposed of the "meritorious claim" element in the instant case. 
Furthermore, evidence that civil action C-80-8309 was defensible 
and that various set offs existed in favor of WILLIAMS was 
contained in the deposition of attorney Martin Becker and at-
tached tn WILLIAMS' Motion For Summary Judgment. Therefore, but 
for the negligence of BARBER, WILLIAMS would not have had a 
twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default iudgment entered 
against him and, hence, said judgment was proximately caused by 
the negligence of BARBER. 
Inasmuch as the element of "meritorious claim" is an 
element of liability which was resolved in \ ivor of WILLIAMS, the 
twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default judgment entered 
against WILLIAMS as a result of the negligence of BARBER should 
have been included in the damages awarded to WILLIAMS. 
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ARGUMENT 
I . 
LAW O F F I C E S 
A FINDING OF "MERITORIOUS CLAIM" IS AN ELEMENT 
OF LIABILITY IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS 
The elements of liability in legal malpractice actions 
are as follows: 
1. The existence of an attorney/client relationship giving 
rise to a duty; 
2. That the attorney either by an act or a failure to act 
violated or breached that duty; 
3. That the attorney!s breach of duty proximately caused 
injury to the client; and 
4. That the Plaintiff sustained actual injury, loss or 
damage. 
See Meiselmanf Attorney Malpractice: Law and Proceduref §3:1 at 
39 (1980), and Bartholomew v. Crockett, 475 N.E.2d 1035, 
(Ill.App.lst~Dist., 1985). 
As a general rule then, a Plaintiff in a legal malprac-
tice action must show that "but for" the negligence of the 
defendant attorney, injury would not have occurred. This is 
simply a restatement of the "proximate cause" element necessary 
to maintain legal malpractice actions. For example, Meiselman, 
supra, at page 42 of his treatise states: 
"•^ he term 'but for1 is in effect substituted 
for 'proximate cause' when the case involves 
legal malpractice. Stated as simply as poss-
ible, this standard, by its very definition 
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would bar recovery by the Plaintiff/client 
unless the attorney's negligent conduct caused 
the alleged injury or harm. Exactly how much 
the Plaintiff must show to meet this standard 
depends on the facts and circumstances of each 
case." 
This reasoning appears to have been applied by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Young v. Bridwell, 437 P. 2d 686, 
20 Utah 2d 332 (1968) where the Court stated: 
"The parties are not in disagreement that in 
order to make out a cause of action against 
the attorney for failing to advise of their 
right to appeal, it would have to be shown 
that there was at least a reasonable likeli-
hood of reversing the judgment and that it 
would have benefitted the Plaintiff." 
While Utah, in the past, appears to have placed the 
burden of proof on this element upon Plaintiff, some Courts now 
shift the burden of proof to the Defendant attorney as to the 
issue of "meritorious claim". See for example Bartholomew v. 
Crockett, supra, Dings v. Callahan, 602 P.2d 542 (Kan., 1979) and 
Glidden v. Terranova, 427 N.E.2d 1169 (Mass., 1981). Glidden, 
supra, is indicative of the emerging trend to shift the burden of 
proof on the issue of "meritorious claim" : i the Defendant 
attorney. The Court there recognized that where an attorney is 
LAW OFFICES 
. BRUCE ALVERSON LTD 
sued by a client for allegedly failing to defend that client's 
underlying litigation, the attorney should bear the burden of 
proving that the client had no defense. The Court stated: 
"We hold that the attorney should indeed bear 
the burden of proof in such a case, for "since 
the client had no obligation fto prove his 
case1 in the underlying action (he could have 
simply required the Plaintiff to prove his 
case), he should not shoulder the burden of 
proving a defense in the malpractice action". 
(Citations omitted.) To require the client 
to prove the underlying action was defensible 
requires him to establish in the malpractice 
suit that which he would not have been re-
quired to prove in the underlying action." 
In any event, whether the traditional or the contempo-
rary approach* is followed, the issue of "meritorious claim" is an 
element of liability in legal malpractice actions and any judg-
ment as to liability disposes of the issue of "meritorious claim" 
as well. Indeed, a Plaintiff's claim against an attorney for 
legal malpractice would be dismissed if there was no finding of 
"meritorious claim". See for example Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins, 
Lemon & Carter, P.C., 564 F.Supp. 1425 (WD Va. , 1983) and 
Garguilo V; Schunk, 395 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1977). Similarly, a 
finding of liability on the part of the defendant attorney is, 
necessarily, also a finding of "meritorious claim". 
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II. 
THE OCTOBER 11, 1983 ORDER GRANTING 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO "ALL ISSUES RELATING TO 
. . . LIABILITY" DISPOSED OF THE "MERITORIOUS CLAIM" 
ELEMENT IN THE INSTANT CASE 
On or about August 10, 1983, WILLIAMS' unopposed Motion 
For Partial Summary Judgment was filed to dispose of the issue of 
liability. Attached as Exhibit "1" to WILLIAMS' Motion was the 
deposition transcript of Attorney Martin Becker who was initially 
retained to defend WILLIAMS in civil action C-80-8309. Thus, Mr. 
Becker was familiar with the lawsuit brought against WILLIAMS and 
the possible defenses thereto. According to Mr. Becker, civil 
action C-80-8309 was "defensible". (See page 38 of the record.) 
However, since civil action C-80-8309 was brought in Third 
Judicial District Court In And For Salt Lake County, State Of 
Utah, Mr. Becker referred the case to BARBER to file an Answer 
and to otherwise defend and represent WILLIAMS in that matter. 
In his letter of December 29, 1980, Mr. Becker summarizes 
WILLIAMS' case to BARBER and emphasizes that civil action C-80-
8309 was defensible and that various set-offs existed in favor of 
WILLIAMS. (See pages 49 and 50 of the record.) A complete copy 
of that correspondence was also attached to the Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. 
On or about October 11, 1983, Judge Frederick granted 
summary judgment on the issue of liability on the basis of 
WILLIAMS' Motion and on the basis that BARBER had not filed any 
opposition thereto. The Order granting partial summary judgment 
states, in pertinent part: 
LAW OFFICES 
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"IT IS ORDERED that an interlocutory judgment 
be, and the same is hereby entered in favor of 
the Plaintiff, and against the Defendants, 
JAMES N. EARBER, MARTIN VERHOEF & DAVID E. 
YOCOM, and each of them, on all the issues in 
this action relating to the liability of the 
Defendants to the Plaintiff and for such 
amount as may be found due to the Plaintiff 
as damages which shall be determined at the 
time of trial." (Emphasis added.) (See pages 
57 through 59 of the record.) 
As noted above, a finding of "meritorious claim" is an 
element of liability in legal malpractice actions and, inasmuch 
as WILLIAMS' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment as to liability 
contained evidence that civil action C-80-8309 was defensible, 
Judge Frederick's order granting partial summary judgment as to 
"all issues relating to . . . liability" disposed of the "merito-
rious claim" element in favor of WILLIAMS. 
III. 
THE TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLAR ($27,000) DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST WILLIAMS AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE 
OF BARBER SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE DAMAGES 
AWARDED TO WILLIAMS 
Inasmuch as a finding of "meritorious claim" is an 
element of •-. liability and partial summary judgment as to all 
issues relating to liability having been entered prior to the 
trial to determine damages, the element of "meritorious clai 
was disposed of in favor of WILLIAMS at the time of summary 
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judgment and no further evidence as to this issue was required to 
be presented at the trial to determine the amount of damages to 
be awarded. Therefore, the twenty seven thousand ($27,000) 
default judgment amount entered against WILLIAMS as a result of 
the negligence of BARBER in civil action C-80-8309 should have 
been included in the damages awarded to WILLIAMS in the instant 
case. The lower court's failure to do so was manifest error and 
the judgment as to damages should be reversed with an order to 
include the twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default in the 
damages awarded to WILLIAMS. 
Furthermore, there is no basis upon which the decision 
of the lower Court can be upheld. Under the traditional "but 
for" test, the lower Court's order against BARBER, et. al. 
disposed of the "meritorious claim" element at the time of 
summary judgment on the issue of liability. Therefore, WILLIAMS 
was not required to again address the issue of "meritorious 
claim" at the trial held to determine the amount of damages to be 
awarded. 
Under the contemporary approach, the burden of proof is 
shifted to the Defendant attorney to show that no valid defense 
could have been asserted or, in other words, that the underlying 
claim was without merit. This was not done in the instant case. 
Indeed, BARBER did not even oppose the Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment on the issue of liability. Therefore, under this 
approach, WILLIAMS would not have been required to present 
additional evidence on the issue of "meritorious claim" at the 
trial on damages. 
LAW O F F I C E S 
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Finally, BARBER'S failure to appear and oppose 
WILLIAMS' Motion is somewhat analogous to the case of Mendoza v. 
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3 !j Schlossman, 448 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1982), where a default judgment on 
I! 
4 il the issue of liability in a legal malpractice action was entered 
li 
5 || against the attorney. The Court held that this disposed of the 
i , 
A 'I 
° JI issue of the lawyer's negligence and of the issue of the validity 
of the underlying claim. Thus, upon assessment of damages, the 
Plaintiff was not required to establish the validity of the 
underlying action but was simply required to establish the 
injuries suffered and their value. This was precisely the 
situation in the instant case. The October 11, 1983 Order 
granting partial summary judgment on liability disposed of the 
"meritorious claim" issue and the May 14, 1985 trial was simply 
required to establish the injuries suffered and their value. 
Therefore, WILLIAMS was not required to present additional 
evidence on the issue of "meritorious claim" at the trial on 
damages. 
Furthermore, the lower Court's decisions as to liabil-
ity and damages are not reconcilable. The lower Court's finding 
of liability necessarily includes the finding of "meritorious 
claim". Yet, the lower Court's decision of damages excluded the 
twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) default judgment on the 
basis that no evidence on the issue of "meritorious claim" was 
presented at the trial on damages. Yet the Court awarded as 
damages attorney's fees and expenses incurred in attempting to 
have the default set aside. If WILLIAM'S claim was not meritor 
ous then why were such damages awarded? If Judge Frederick found 
that WILLIAM'S underlying claim was without merit, then he has 
awarded attorney's fees and expenses incurred in attempting to 
have the default set aside so that WILLIAMS could incur further 
expenses in defending a claim for which there was no defense. 
This simply does not make any sense and constitutes reversible 
error. 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the twenty seven 
thousand dollar ($27,000) default amount must be included in the 
damages awarded to WILLIAMS. WILLIAMS further requests that all 
costs, pursuant to URAP Rule 34, and attorney's fees incurred by 
reason of this appeal be awarded as well. 
! 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Points & Authorities, Appel-
lant DALVIN J. WILLIAMS respectfully requests that this Honorable 
Court reverse the August 12, 1985 judgment as to damages and 
5 j! further requests that this Court order included in the damages 
6
 !J awarded to WILLIAMS the twenty seven thousand dollar ($27,000) 
default amount inasmuch as this amount was also the proximate 
result of the negligence of Respondent JAMES N. BARBER. 
WILLIAMS further requests that all costs and attorney's fees 
incurred by reason of this appeal be awarded as well. 
J. BRUCE ALVERSON, LTD. 
By /^^^2^ 
ERIC TAYLOR, ESOT 
600 S. Eighth Street 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 
Attorney for Appellant, 
DALVIN J. WILLIAMS 
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CHAPTER 3 
Proximate Cause In Legal 
Malpractice 
§ 3:1. Introduction and general principles 
§ 3:2. Burden of proving proximate cause 
§ 3:3. The "but for" requirement 
§ 3:4. The solvency requirement 
§ 3:5. Case within a case requirement 
§ 3:6. Contemporary approaches to the case within a case requirement 
§ 3:7. —Presumption of validity of underlying claim 
§ 3:8. --Shifting the burden 
§ 3:9. —The lost opportunity test 
§ 3:10. —Bifurcation of the legal malpractice action 
§ 3:11. —Standard of "lost substantial possibility" 
§ 3:1. Introduction and general principles. 
In a legal malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove:1 
1. the existence of an attorney-client relationship giving rise to 
a duty;2 
2. that the attorney either by an act or a failure to act 
violated or breached that duty;3 
3. that the attorney's breach of duty proximately caused 
injury to the client;4 and 
1. Spangler v Sellers (1881, CC Ohio) 5 F 
882; Herston v Whitesell (1977, Ala) 348 
So 2d 1054; Campbell v Magana (1960, 2d 
Dist) 184 Cal App 2d 751, 8 Cal Rptr 32; 
Freeman v Rubin (1975, Fla App D3) 318 
So 2d 540; Public Taxi Service, Inc. v 
Barrett (1976) 44 111 App 3d 452, 2 111 Dec 
789, 357 NE2d 1232; Glasgow v Hall (1975) 
24 Md App 525, 332 A2d 722; McLellan v 
Fuller (1917) 226 Mass 374, 115 NE 481; 
Christy v Saliterman (1970) 288 Minn 144, 
179 NW2d 288; Carpenter v Weichert 
(1976, 3d Dept) 51 App Div 2d 817, 379 
NYS2d 191; Lamprecht v Bien (1908> 125 
App Div 811, 110 NYS 128, Hansen v 
Wightman (1975) 14 Wash App 78, 538 
P2d 1238. 
2. McGlone v Lacey (1968, DC SD) 288 F 
Supp 662; Banerian v O'Malley (1974, 1st 
Dist) 42 Cal App 3d 604, 116 Cal Rptr 919; 
Berman v Rubin (1976) 138 Ga App 849, 
227 SE2d 802. 
3. Underwood v Woods (1969, CA8 Mo) 
406 F2d 910; Collins v Slocum (1975, La 
App) 317 So 2d 672, cert den (La) 321 So 
2d 362 and cert den (La) 321 So 2d 363 and 
cert den (La) 321 So 2d 364; Seymour v 
Cagger (1878, NY) 13 Hun 29. 
4. Spangler v Sellers (1881, CC Ohio) 5 F 
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4. that the plaintiff sustained actual injury, loss or damage.5 
This chapter focuses attention on the third element above; 
that is, the requirement of causal connection between the al-
leged negligence of the attorney and the claimed harm sustained 
by the client as a result thereof. Although the basic tenets of 
proximate cause in a legal malpractice case are essentially the 
same as in other negligence cases, the manner in which the 
causal relationship is proven is somewhat more complicated. 
Undoubtedly, the plaintiff-client's loss must be proximately 
caused by the attorney's negligence.8 However, in attorney mal-
practice, the causal requirement is worded in the negative. For 
example, it is often said that the plaintiff can recover against 
the defendant-attorney only when it can be shown that the 
injury would not have occurred "but for" the negligence of the 
lawyer. Thus, the plaintiff must establish that the total or 
partial loss would not have occurred had it not been for some act 
or omission on the part of the attorney.7 In other words, the 
plaintiff must show that "but for" the negligence of the lawyer, 
the client's cause of action or defense against a claim in the 
underlying action would have been successful.8 
882; Walker v Porter (1974, 2d Dist) 44 Cal 
App 3d 174, 118 Cal Rptr 468; Lysick v 
Walcom (1968, 1st Dist) 258 Cal App 2d 
136, 65 Cal Rptr 406, 28 ALR3d 368; John-
son v Haskins (1938, Mo) 119 SW2d 235; 
Milton v Hare (1929) 130 Or 590, 280 P 
511. 
5. Floro v Lawton (1960, 2d Dist) 187 Cal 
App" 2d 657, 10 Cal Rptr 98; Coon v Gins-
berg (1973) 32 Colo App 206, 509 P2d 1293; 
Rubenstein & Rubenstein v Papadakos 
(1968, 1st Dept) 31 App Div 2d 615, 295 
NYS2d 876, affd 25 NY2d 751, 303 NYS2d 
508, 250 NE2d 570; Leavy v Kramer (1962) 
34 Misc 2d 479, 226 NYS2d 349; Flynn v 
Judge (1912) 149 App Div 278, 133 NYS 
794; Fireman's Fund American Ins. Co. v 
Patterson & Lamberty, Inc. (1975, Tex Civ 
App) 528 SW2d 67, writ ref nre; Widem-
shek v Faie (1962) 17 Wis 2d 337, 117 
NW2d 275. 
6. Bonhiver v Rotenberg Schwartzman 
(1972, CA7 111) 461 F2d 925; Spangler v 
Sellers (1881, CC Ohio) 5 F 882; Lysick v 
Walcom (1968, 1st Dist) 258 Cal App 2d 
136, 65 Cal Rptr 406, 28 ALR3d 368; 
Walker v Porter (1974, 2d Dist) 44 Cal App 
3d 174, 118 Cal Rptr 468; Adams, George 
& Wood v Travelers Ins. Co. (1978, Fla 
App D3) 359 So 2d 457; Meagher v Kavli 
(1959) 256 Minn 54, 97 NW2d 370; Cre-
ative Inception, Inc. v Andrews (1975, 1st 
Dept) 50 App Div 2d 553, 377 NYS2d 1; 
Murphy v Edwards & Warren (1978) 36 
NC App 653, 245 SE2d 212, cert den 295 
NC 551, 248 SE2d 728; Ward v Arnold 
(1958) 52 Wash 2d 581, 328 P2d 164. 
Annotation: Attorney's liability for neg-
ligence in preparing or conducting litiga-
tion, 45 ALR2d 5. 
7. Feldesman v McGovern (1941) 44 Cal 
App 2d 566, 112 P2d 645; Gambert v Hart 
(1872) 44 Cal 542 (ovrld on other grounds 
Smith v Lewis 13 Cal 3d 349, 118 Cal Rptr 
621, 530 P2d 589, 78 ALR3d 231 (ovrld on 
other grounds Re Marriage of Brown 15 
Cal 3d 838, 126 Cal Rptr 633, 544 P2d 
561)) as stated in Wright v Williams (2d 
Dist) 47 Cal App 3d 802, 121 Cal Rptr 194; 
Trustees of Schools v Schroeder (1971) 2 111 
App 3d 1009, 278 NE2d 431; Titsworth v 
Mondo (1978) 95 Misc 2d 233, 407 NYS2d 
793; Spangler v Sellers (1881, CC Ohio) 5 F 
882. 
8. Godbout v Norton (1977, Minn) 262 
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proximate cause or a proximate cause. The difference can be 
vitally important. Where the proximate cause is required,15 a 
defendant may avoid liability by establishing that some other 
cause, in fact any other cause, could have played a role in 
bringing about the plaintiffs injury. It is obviously to the advan-
tage of the plaintiff-client that a proximate cause be the require-
ment. The weight of authority demonstrates that the trend 
clearly appears to be in that direction.16 
Up to this point we know that the plaintiff-client must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant-attor-
ney's negligence proximately caused the injury, loss or harm and 
that such injury, loss or harm would not have occurred but for 
the negligence of the defendant. Remaining to be discussed is 
that which the plaintiff must show in order to prove the element 
of causation. 
§ 3:3. The "but for" requirement. 
Probably the most difficult obstacle on the road to recovery in 
a legal malpractice case is the "but for" requirement,17 the 
traditional test of causation. The term "but for" is in effect 
substituted for "proximate cause" when the case involves legal 
malpractice.18 Stated as simply as possible, this standard, by its 
very definition, would bar recovery by the plaintiff-client unless 
the attorney's negligent conduct caused the alleged injury or 
harm. Exactly how much the plaintiff must show to meet the 
standard depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 
A small minority of jurisdictions maintain that a plaintiff 
must prove his case with "certainty."19 In effect, such a demand 
certainty" standard of Flynn v Judge 
(1912) 149 App Div 278, 133 NYS 794. 
15. Ishmael v Millington (1966, 3d Dist) 
241 Cal App 2d 520, 50 Cal Rptr 592; 
Christy v Saliterman (1970) 288 Minn 144, 
179 NW2d 288; Ward v Arnold (1958) 52 
Wash 2d 581, 328 P2d 164. 
16. Cline v Watkins (1977, 2d Dist) 66 
Cal App 3d 174, 135 Cal Rptr 838; Starr v 
Mooslin (1971, 2d Dist) 14 Cal App 3d 988, 
92 Cal Rptr 583; Modica v Crist (1954) 129 
Cal App 2d 144, 276 P2d 614; Hansen v 
•Wightman (1975) 14 Wash App 78, 538 
P2d 1238; Transcontinental Ins. Co. v 
Faler (1973) 9 Wash App 610, 513 P2d 864. 
17. Comment, New Developments in Le-
gal Malpractice, 26 Am U L Rev 408 
(1977); Comment, Attorney Malpractice—A 
"Greenian" Analysis, 52 Neb L Rev 1003 
(1978). 
18. See, Comment, Legal Malpractice, 27 
Ark L Rev 452, 466 (1973). 
19. Coon v Ginsberg (1973) 32 Colo App 
206, 509 P2d 1293; Weiner v Moreno (1973, 
Fla App D3) 271 So 2d 217; Better Homes, 
Inc. v Rodgers (1961, ND W Va) 195 F 
Supp 93. 
42 
MENDOZA v. SCHLOSSMAN 45 
Cite as, App.Div., 448 N.Y.S.2d 45 
1. Attorney and Client &=> 182(3) 
Plaintiffs former attorneys had com-
mon-law retaining lien on papers in their J ° s e MENDOZA, Appellant, 
possession.
 v# 
2. Attorney and Client <s=>75(3) 
Plaintiffs former attorneys, who had 
common-law retaining lien on papers in 
their possession, could not be required to 
turn over papers to plaintiff's new counsel 
prior to hearing to determine whether value 
of their legal services was in excess of sums 
previously paid to them. 
Doris L. Sassower, White Plains (Barton 
Denis Eaton of counsel), appellant pro se. 
Richard Brill, White Plains, for respon-
dent. 
Before MOLLEN, P. J., and LAZER, 
MANGANO and NIEHOFF, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT. 
Appeal from so much of an order of the 
Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated 
March 11, 1981, as directed appellants to 
deliver to plaintiffs new counsel the file in 
the action. 
Order reversed insofar as appealed from, 
on the law, without costs or disbursements 
and matter remitted to Special Term for a 
hearing to fix the amount of the outgoing 
attorneys' lien, if any, and to condition the 
turnover upon payment of the sum thereby 
found to be due from plaintiff to her for-
mer attorneys or the posting of security 
therefor. The hearing shall proceed expedi-
tiously. 
[1,2] Plaintiffs former attorneys have 
a common-law retaining lien on the papers 
in their possession, and the circumstances 
are not so exigent as to require turnover of 
the papers prior to a hearing to determine 
whether the value of their legal services is 
in excess of the sums previously paid to 
them (see Gamble v. Gamble, 78 A.D.2d 673, 
432 N.Y.S.2d 405; Yaron v. Yaron, 58 
A.D.2d 752, 396 N.Y.S.2d 225; Shatzkin v. 
Shahmoon, 19 A.D.2d 658, 242 N.Y.S.2d 72). 
George M. SCHLOSSMAN, Respondent 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
Second Department. 
March 15, 1982. 
Plaintiff appealed from an order and 
judgment by the Supreme Court, Kings 
County, Lawrence, J., which dismissed his 
legal malpractice complaint. The Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, held that default 
judgment on the issue of liability in a legal 
malpractice action disposes of the issue of 
lawyer's negligence and the validity of the 
underlying claim, and thus upon assessment 
of damages, plaintiff is not required to es-
tablish validity of the underlying action but 
must establish the injuries suffered and 
their value. 
Reversed and remitted. 
1. Attorney and Client e=> 129(2) 
An action for legal malpractice re-
quires proof of the three essential elements 
of negligence of the attorney, that the neg-
ligence was proximate cause of the loss 
sustained, and proof of actual damages. 
2. Judgment <s=»126(2) 
Default judgment on issue of liability 
in a legal malpractice action disposes of the 
issue of lawyer's negligence and validity of 
the underlying claim, and thus upon assess-
ment of damages, plaintiff is not required 
to establish validity of the underlying ac-
tion but must establish the injuries suffered 
and their value. 
DeLukey & Shapiro, P. C, Brooklyn 
(Stanley Shapiro, Brooklyn, of counsel), for 
appellant. 
46 448 NEW YORK SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES 
Irving Friedberg, Brooklyn (Norman 
Bard, Brooklyn, of counsel; Karen Z. Bell, 
New York City, on the brief), for respon-
dent. 
Before LAZER, J. P., and MANGANO, 
O'CONNOR and BROWN, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT. 
In a legal malpractice action, plaintiff 
appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme 
Court, Kings County, entered October 23, 
1980, which dismissed his complaint, and (2) 
a judgment entered thereon on December 2, 
1980. 
Appeal from the order dismissed (see 
Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 383 
N.Y.S.2d 285, 347 N.E.2d 647). 
Judgment reversed, order vacated, and 
matter remitted to Trial Term for further 
proceedings consistent herewith. 
Plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs. 
[1,2] Where a default judgment is en-
tered against a defendant in a legal mal-
practice action, plaintiff is not required to 
prove the probable success of the underly-
ing action upon an assessment of damages. 
An action for legal malpractice requires 
proof of three essential elements: (1) the 
negligence of the attorney; (2) that the 
negligence was the proximate cause of the 
loss sustained; and (3) proof of actual dam-
ages (see Creative Inception v. Andrews, 50 
A.D.2d 553, 377 N.Y.S.2d 1). A default 
judgment on the issue of liability in a legal 
malpractice action disposes of the issue of 
the lawyer's negligence and the validity of 
the underlying claim. Therefore upon as-
sessment of damages, plaintiff is not re-
quired to establish the validity of the un-
derlying action but must establish the inju-
ries suffered and their value. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
87 A D 2d 605 
Philippe L. MAITREJEAN et 
al., Respondents, 
v. 
LEVON PROPERTIES CORPORATION 
et al., Appellants. 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
Second Department. 
March 15, 1982. 
Defendants appealed from judgment 
entered by the Supreme Court, Suffolk 
County, Baisley, J., awarding compensatory 
and punitive damages against them in ac-
tion to recover damages for maintenance of 
nuisance. The Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, held that award of punitive dam-
ages was improper where there was no evi-
dence that defendants were guilty of "qua-
si-criminal conduct" or of such utterly reck-
less behavior as would justify award, plain-
tiffs had not alleged facts demonstrating 
malicious intent on part of defendants to 
injure plaintiffs, and plaintiffs had not 
demonstrated type of gross, wanton or will-
ful fraud or other morally culpable conduct 
upon which punitive damages could be 
awarded. 
Modified and affirmed. 
Nuisance c=>50(6) 
Punitive damages were improperly 
awarded in action to recover damages for 
maintenance of nuisance where there was 
no evidence in record that defendants were 
guilty of "quasi-criminal conduct" or of 
such utterly reckless behavior as would jus-
tify award for punitive damages, plaintiffs 
had not alleged facts demonstrating mali-
cious intent on part of defendants to injure 
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs had not demon-
strated type of gross, wanton or wilful 
fraud or other morally culpable conduct 
upon which punitive damages could be 
awarded. 
Correction page 
replaces page 109 - 110 
12-18-84 
Rule 34. AWARD OF COSTS. 
(a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, 
if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appel-
lant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the 
Court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed 
against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order 
is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the respondent unless 
otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed 
in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed as ordered by the 
Court. Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and Against the State of Utah. In cases in-
volving the State of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an 
award* of costs for or against the State shall be at the discre-
tion of the Court unless specifically required or prohibited by 
law, 
(c) Costs of 3riefs and Attachments, Record, Bonds and Other 
Expenses on Appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor 
of the prevailing party in the appeal: The actual costs of a 
printed or typewritten brief and attachments not to exceed S3.0 0 
for each page; actual costs incurred in the preparation and trans-
mission of the record including costs of the reporter's transcnpr 
unless otherwise ordered by the Court; premiums paid for super-
sedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the 
fees for filing and docketing the appeal. 
109 
(d) Bill of Costs Taxed After Remittitur. When costs are 
awarded to a party in an appeal from a lower court, a party 
claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed 
with the clerk of the court below, serve upon the adverse party 
'and file with the clerk of the court an itemized and verified 
bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days of service 
of the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection 
together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the court 
below. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the 
alloted time, the clerk of the court shall tax the costs as filed 
and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto, which judgment 
shall be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and 
effect as in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost 
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon 
reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a 
final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered 
in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the 
case of other judgments of record. The determination of the 
clerk shall be reviewable by the district court upon the request 
of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in Other Proceedings and Agency Appeals. 
In all other matters before the Court, including appeals from 
an agency, costs may be allowed as in cases on appeal from a lower 
court. Within .15 days after the expiration of the time in which 
110 
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a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after 
an order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have 
been awarded may file with the Clerk of the Court and serve upon 
the adverse party an itemized and verified bill of costs. The 
adverse party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill 
of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to have the costs 
taxed by the Clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed 
within the alloted time, the Clerk shall thereupon tax the costs 
and enter judgment against the adverse party. If the adverse 
party timely objects to the cost bill, the Clerk, upon reasonable 
notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs, tax 
the same, and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the 
adverse party. The determination by the Clerk shall be reviewable 
by the Court upon the request of either party made within 5 days 
of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument 
shall not be permitted. A judgment under this section may be 
filed with the clerk of any district court in the State who shall 
docket a ceritifed copy of the same in the manner and with the 
same force and effect as judgments of the district court. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This Rule is a substantial departure from current practice and 
rules. 
Paragraph (a). This Paragraph provides that the prevailing party 
shall generally be awarded costs, unless the Supreme Court orders other-
wise. It is not anticipated that written opinions of the Supreme Court 
will, after adoption of this Rule, specifically award costs unless 
there is a departure from the general rule. 
Ill 
Paragraph (b). Prior practice under Rule 54(d)(1) allowed costs 
against the State, its officers and agencies only to the extent allowed 
by law. Rule 33 modifies that concept to allow costs either for or 
against the State of Utah, its officers and/or agencies under the theory 
that if the State can recover costs, it should also be subject to costs 
at the discretion of the Court, unless specifically prohibited by law. 
Paragraph (c). The paragraph sets forth with particularity what 
costs are recoverable, and raises the allowable costs for each page 
of the original brief to $3.00 per page from $2.00 per page under prior 
Rule 75(p)(5) URCivP. The words "actual costs" in the paragraph ensure 
that parties only seek actual costs where the actual costs are less 
than $3*00 per page. 
Paracraoh (d?. This paragraph deals with costs on appeal from 
lower courts. The rule differs substantially from prior Rule 54(d)(3) 
URCivP in that costs are taxed, if an objection is timely made, by 
the district court clerk. It is not anticipated that the district 
court would be involved in taxing costs unless a party objects to the 
district court clerk's taxation of ccsts. The costs taxed by the dis-
trict court will automatically be docketed as a judgment without the 
necessity of a formal motion to enter a judgment for costs. The rule 
is self-enforcing, and a party desiring to recover costs must make 
a timely filing in the district court or costs are waived. 
Paracraoh fe). This paragraph deals with awarding" costs in pro-
ceedings other than appeals from district courts, such as original 
proceedings and agency appeals. Costs and the taxing of costs are 
handled by the Clerk of the Supreme Court in the same manner as" pre-
scribed for the clerk of the district court under paragraph (d) of 
this rule, including a review without oral argument by the Supreme 
Court if proper application is filed. A judgment for costs in the 
Supreme Court may be filed and docketed with any district court in 
the State of Utah with the same force and effect as a judgment entered 
by the district court. 
The provisions of Rule 54(d)(3) and (4) URCivP dealing with the 
assessment and taxing of costs on appeal and in original proceedings 
before the Supreme Court are repealed as of the effective date of tr.ese 
Rules. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DALVIN J. WILLIAMS, 3 
3 
PLAINTIFF, 3 
3 
VS. ) CIVIL NO. 82-4887 
3 
JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN 3 
VERHOEF AND DAVID E. 3 
YOCOM, PARTNERS IN THE 3 
LAW FIRM OF BARBER, 3 
VERHOEF 5 YOCOM, 3 
3 
DEFENDANTS. 3 
3 
DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION 
OF 
MARTIN BECKER 
TAKEN ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF 
AT LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 
DECEMBER 2, 1982 
2:00 P.M. 
REPORTED BY: GARLAND L. WALKER 
C.S.R. NO. lkk 
B R O W E R A N D A S S O C I A T E S 
S T E N O T Y P E R E P O R T E R S 
L A S V E G A S . N E V A D A (S910S 
6 
MRS. WILLIAMS: NO, IT'S THE $5,000 BONNIE WROTE 
TO US FOR INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. 
THE WITNESS: IN FACT, I STILL HAVE THE ORIGINAL 
[ OF THAT CHECK, THE D & M ENTERPRISES "CHECK IN MY FILE, 
CHECK 327. THAT WAS WRITTEN BY BONNIE BRUCE TO D 5 M 
ENTERPRISES FOR $5,000. IT WAS A STOP PAYMENT ON THAT 
CHECK. THAT'S SOME OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DEFENSE OF THE 
LAWSUIT, I BELIEVE, MRS. BRUCE'S FAILURE TO KEEP HER 
AGREEMENT. 
Q (BY MR. MORRIS) SHOWING THERE WAS A VALID 
DEFENSE, AT LEAST AS FAR AS YOU WERE CONCERNED AT THAT 
TIME? 
A AS FAR AS I WAS CONCERNED, I FELT THAT THE 
ACTION WAS DEFENSIBLE. 
Q THE NEXT PARAGRAPH STATES, "FINALLY, ENCLOSED 
YOU WILL FIND MY TRUST ACCOUNT CHECK IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$500." WAS THAT A TRUST ACCOUNT CHECK WRITTEN ON THE 
TRUST ACCOUNT OF SORENSON 5 BECKER? 
A CAN WE GO OFF THE RECORD FOR A SECOND. 
MR. MORRIS: SURE. 
(OFF THE RECORD BRIEFLY, NOT 
REPORTED.) 
THE WITNESS: I'M NOT SURE. I'M UNCERTAIN 
AS TO WHETHER IT WAS THE TRUST ACCOUNT OF SORENSON 5 BECKER 
OR JUST THE TRUST ACCOUNT OF PAUL SORENSON PRIOR TO THE 
B R O W E R A N D A S S O C I A T E S 
STENOTYPE REPORTERS 
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89102 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
J2J LAS >ECAS BOl'LE* ARD SOUTH 
LAS VEGAS.Sl\ ADA 19101 
TELEPHONE (702) H5U25 
pFAl'l SOPENSON 
ARTIS H BECKER 
iTRICA X. DOYLE 
REPLYFL/ERTO: O u r F i l e N o . 5 8 1 7 
£'£~—%fJ& James Barber, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
431 Sounh 300 East 
Suite 104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
December 29, 19 80 
Re: Dalvin J. Williams/C. Grant Morrison/ Bonnie Bruce 
Dear Mr. Barber: 
Pursuant to our telephone conversation of this 
date, enclosed you will find a copy of the Summons and 
Complaint served on .Mr. Williams on December 15, 19 80. 
Also enclosed you will find the following: 
1^ A copy of the original Agreement dated 
July 12, 1979 between Dalvin J. Williams and Bonnie Bruce. 
2. A copy of the Distributor Agreement dated 
April 25, 1979 wherein Mr. Williams obtained distribution 
rights for those counties of the State of Utah listed on 
Exhibit "B". 
3. A Distribution Agreement dated July 16, 1979 
wherein Dalvin J. Williams, pursuant to his contract with 
Bonnie Bruce, obtained distribution rights for the states 
of Idaho and Nevada. 
4. A demand letter signed by Grant Morrison 
and Bonnie Bruce which lias been dated April 19, 1980. 
5. Numerous letters dated before and after 
the Agreement in question which reflect efforts to market 
and test the Acton Energy Control Modules, which is the 
subject matter of the Distribution Agreements. 
My client indicates that C. Grant Morrison is 
a friend of Bonnie Bruce who either loaned her the 
$12,000 sum or co-signed so thar Ms. Bruce could borrow 
those funds. 2^ r. Williams has never had any direct con-
tractual relationships with Mr. Morrison in regard to this 
matter. 
S&l-BaiaT / M 
December 29, 19 80 
Pace 2 
It is Mr. Williams1 position that he has mace 
all best efforts to comply with the terms and conditions 
of his Agreement with Ms. Brooks. She"was and is fully 
familiar with the product and was at the very least a 
fully knowledgable investor. 
The problem that existed was that the market 
for the Acton Energy Control Modules was very, very 
active from the standpoint of major entities who were 
willing to try the product on a test basis but ultimately 
unwilling to purchase the modules. There are still some 
$15,000 worth of retail value modules stored in Salt Lake 
City and Mr. Williams would be happy to turn these items 
over to Ms. Bruce. 
My client is not interested.in protracted 
litigation, however, he certainly does not feel that he 
owes the sum of $12,000 and/or punitive damages to the 
Plaintiffs. Mr. Williams feels that he fully and faith-
fully plied with the terms and conditions of the 
July, Lbf'/b Agreement and without the necessary sales 
to .make a sufficient income he was forced to discontinue 
business. Ms. Bruce is more than welcome to 100% of the 
distributorship for the applicable Utah counties as well 
as Idaho and Nevada. 
Also enclosed you will find a $5,000 check 
written to D & M Enterprises and dated February 11, 1980. 
You will note, that Ms. Bruce has stopped payment on this 
check, thereby causing damage to my client. No payment 
has ever been received on this check and while Mr. Williams 
is not particularly interested in collecting it except for 
off-set value, it certainly shows that in early 1980 
3onnie Bruce was still sufficiently happy with her dealings 
with Dalvin Williams. 
Finally, enclosed you will find my Trust Account 
Check in the amount of $500.00 as and for an initial 
retainer in regard to this matter. 
Please advise us as to any additional informa-
tion you might need and feel free to call Mr. Williams 
at his home -number which is (702) 564-7328 or his office 
number which is (702) 871-7121. 
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CASE NO: C^^-^T^H 
Defendant 
Type of hearing: Div. Annul 
Present: Pltf Deft. 
P.Atty: r f X Q v - W W-n<<\;-> 
D.Atty: 
Sworn & Examined: 
Pltf: 
Others: 
Deft:. 
Supp. Order. OSC. Other. 
Summons. 
Waiver 
Stipulation. 
Publication. 
• Default of Pltf/Deft Entered 
Date: 
Judge: ~ 
Clerk: "= 
Reporter: 
Bailiff: _ 
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ORDERS: 
D Custody Evaluation Ordered 
• Visitation Rights 
• Custody Awarded To 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
• Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
• Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:. 
= Per Month 
Per Month/Year • Alimony Waived 
• Atty. fees to the. 
• Home To: 
in the amount of. • Deferred 
• Furnishings To: 
• Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
• Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
• Restraining Order Entered Against. 
. Automobile To: 
D Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $. 
• 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
G Divorce Granted To As 
G Decree To Become Final: G Upon Entry G 3-Month Interlocutory 
Q Former Name of . Is Restored 
G Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft 
Returnable . Bail. 
G Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
C Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders 
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lev: FILED iN CLERK'S OFFiCE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
OCT 111953 
i l l MONTE J . MORRIS, ESQUIRE 
I P. 0. Box 843 
2 HHenderson, NV 89015 
l! (702) 564-2503 
O || 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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By 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DALVIN J. WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
12'! JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN 
|| VERKOEF and DAVID E. 
13IIY0C0M, Partners in the 
'law firm of BARBER, VERHOEF 
& YOCOM, 14 
15 
16 
17 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 82-4837 
|. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of 
18 j| Liability, having come before the Court for hearing on the 
^19J!3rd day of October, 1983, MONTE J. MORRIS, ESQUIRE, counsel of 
20 li record for the Plaintiff, appearing for and in behalf of the 
II 
21 |j Plaintiff; the Defendants not appearing, either in person or by 
ji 
22.! counsel; the Court finds that notice has been given according to 
231! law and this being the time and place for the hearing of this 
241; matter and there appearing no objection thereto, Plaintiff's 
25 ji motion is granted; and 
26 |j IT IS ORDERED that an interlocutory judgment be, and 
271' the same is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff, and against 
23'ithe Defendants, JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN VERHOEF and DAVID E. 
291! Y0C0M, and each one of them, on all the issues in this action 
20
' relating to the liability of the Defendants to the Plaintiff and 
31' 
32 
ss 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
-20 
2 1 i 
I 
231 
24» 
I 
25! 
j 
26' 
27 ! 
28' 
29i 
I 
30 
31! 
32 
for such amount as may be found due to the Plaintiff as damages 
which shall be determined at the time of trial. 
DATED this ]\ day of October, 1983. 
BY THE /COURT: 
ATTEST 
H-OIXONHINDLEY 
/ Clerk* 
By- V ML 
tyClsrfc 
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JAMES N. BARBER, #01 $8 
MARTIN VERHOEF, # 1 » ^ \ 
DAVID E. YOCOM, #3£8V,v 
Attorneys at Law \ '•;•-.,.-, 
255 East 400 South,\Sujte 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah'* 8.4ril 
Telephone: (801) 355V-8W. 
3sit Uk'3 County Utah 
AUG 1 2 i9S5 
rK 3rd D>st. Coun H. P'*on 7t 
Deputy o.e. 
IN THE THHtD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DALVIN J. WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN 
VERHOEF, and DAVID E. YOCOM, 
partners in the lawfirm of 
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil NO082-4887 
The captioned matter came on regularly before the Court 
for trial on Tuesday, May 14, 1985, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. 
before the Honourable Dennis J. Frederick, District Judge, sitting 
without a jury. Plaintiff was represented by Monte J. Morris, 
Esq. Defendants, and each of them, appeared pro se. 
Opening statements were heard, witnesses were called 
and testified on behalf of the plaintiff, plaintiff rested, ana 
defendants informed the Court that they had no further evidence 
to present. Thereupon, defendants jointly and severally moved 
the Court to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint and counsel made closing 
arguments. The Court announced its readiness to rule. The 
foregoing proceedings having been had and good cause therefor 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IER. VERHOEF 
i YOCOM 
:RNEYS AT LAW 
AST 400 SOUTH 
a p p e a r i n g , t h e Court does now h e r e w i t h make and e n t e r the 
fo l lowing: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The r e c o r d of t h i s c a s e d e m o n s t r a t e s that the 
Complaint was duly f i l e d , s e r v i c e was had upon a l l d e f e n d a n t s , 
and answers were duly recorded . The acts and prac t i ces of which 
p l a i n t i f f complains occurred in Sal t Lake City , Sa l t Lake County, 
Utah. 
2 . On or about December 15, 1980, p l a i n t i f f was duly 
s e r v e d w i t h a Summons and Compla in t in c i v i l a c t i o n number 
C-80-8309 in the Third Judic ia l D i s t r i c t Court of Sal t Lake County, 
Utah, t i t l e d "C. Grant Morrison and Bonnie Bruce v s . D a l v i n J. 
W i l l i a m s " , by which p l a i n t i f f s sought to recover from p l a i n t i f f 
h e r e i n the p r i n c i p a l sum of $ 1 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 for breach of c o n t r a c t 
together with other damages. 
3 . On or about January 2, 1981 , a f t e r having had a 
c o n v e r s a t i o n wi th Martin Becker , E s q . , of Las Vegas, Nevada, in 
which Becker recommended Barber as an a t t o r n e y to handle that 
m a t t e r in S a l t Lake C i t y , p l a i n t i f f had a c o n v e r s a t i o n with 
Defendant Barber in which he retained Barber to defend him in the 
a f o r e s a i d a c t i o n , and pursuant to which p l a i n t i f f here in paid 
Barber the sum of $500.00 as a t torney ' s f e e s . 
4 . At that time the firm name under which Defendants 
Barber, Verhoef , and Yocom operated, as well as their l e t terhead, 
p r o f e s s i o n a l and t e l e p h o n e l i s t i n g s , p l e a d i n g papers, and their 
n o 
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1979-1980 business license failed to specify any relationship 
between them other than legal partnership. At that time they were 
not partners, but were operating under a joint office sharing 
arrangement in their individual practice of law. Plaintiff 
Williams was not aware of the existence of Defendants Verhoef OP 
Yocom when he retained Barber as his attorney; nor was he aware 
of Barber's relationship with any other person in the practice 
of law. He did not, therefore, rely on Defendants Verhoef or Yocom 
in any way in his retention of Barber; and retained Barber solely 
in reliance on the individual recommendation of Martin Becker. 
5. Based on the conversation and payment of money 
described in paragraph 3 above, Defendant Barber undertook a 
contractual obligation to timely file an answer on behalf of 
plaintiff herein in case number 080-8309 and otherwise diligently 
defend the interests of Dalvin J. Williams as they might appear 
in the case of Morrison vs. Williams. 
6. The initial service of Summons in the Morrison-
Williams matter was improper, and proper service was not effected 
upon Williams until on or about January 28, 1981, with the result 
that his answer thereon was required to be filed on or before 
Wednesday, February 27, 1981. 
7. Despite his contract to defend Williams, Barber 
failed to file an answer on behalf of Williams before February 
27, 1981, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Q O 
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8. On or about March 4, 1981, plaintiffs, in case 
number C-80-8039, conducted a default hearing before the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, District Judge, pursuant to which Judge Sawaya 
made Findings of Fact and executed a Judgment against Dalvin J. 
Williams in a sum in excess of $27,000-00 on March 6, 1981, the 
same having been filed with the clerk of the court on March 12, 
1981. 
9. During the period January 28, 1981, through March 
12, 1981, no correspondence or notice of any hearing or any other 
matter was served upon either Dalvin J- Williams or James N. Barber 
giving either of them notice of the entry of Judgment against 
Williams in favor of Morrison. 
10. On March 10, 1981, James N. Barber duly filed an 
answer on behalf of Williams. 
11. No notice of the entry of the Judgment or Default 
against Williams was given to Defendant Williams until October 
or November of 1981, by which time Plaintiff Morrison had sued 
upon his Utah Judgment in the state of Nevada, obtained a Judgment, 
and issued execution or garnishment documents thereon against 
Williams out of the District Court of Clark County, Nevada. 
Service of these documents was the first notice that Williams had 
of the entry of the Default Judgment in the Third Judicial District 
Court on March 12, 1981. No notice of the entry of any judgment 
in favor of Morrison was given to Williams or Barber before the 
three-month period for filing a motion to set aside the Judgment 
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under Rule 6 0 ( b ) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, had already 
expired. On or about November 18, 1981, promptly after the 
issuance of notice of entry of the Judgment, Defendant Barber filed 
a M o t i o n to Set Aside the Default Judgment in case number 
C-80-8309; and thereafter, filed an additional and different Motion 
to Set Aside the Default Judgment on January 26, 1982, both with 
supporting affidavits. 
12. By January of 1982 Williams had procured other 
counsel who had spoken by phone and through correspondence with 
James N. Barber, notifying him that he was then representing the ; 
i 
plaintiffs in this case. 
13. No hearing was set on either motion to dismiss until 
late May, 1982. Thereafter, a hearing on the motion to set aside 
the Default Judgment was held before the Honorable James S. Sawaya 
on June 14, 1982. This motion was duly denied on June 18, 1982. 
During the interim between March 6, 1981, and trial hereof, 
successive writs of garnishment were filed by Plaintiff Morrison 
against Dalvin J. Williams with his employer in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
During the period of such garnishments, Plaintiff Williams resigned-
his employment, under pressure to do so, which may or may not have 
been generated, in part, by the service of said garnishments. 
14. During 1982 Plaintiff Williams was unable to meet 
the first mortgage or trust deed obligation on his home located 
in Henderson, Nevada, and therefore, the same was repossessed by 
First Interstate Bank to discharge the indebtedness of Dalvin J. 
Williams which was secured thereby. 
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15 . D u r i n g t h a t same p e r i o d P l a i n t i f f W i l l i a m s f i l e d 
b a n k r u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g s in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Cour t for 
t h e D i s t r i c t of Nevada , under C h a p t e r 13 of t h e Bankruptcy Act , 
which p r o c e e d i n g s were u l t i m a t e l y d ismissed by reason of W i l l i a m s ' 
f a i l u r e t o a b i d e by t h e t e r m s of a wage e a r n e r p l a n e n t e r e d 
t h e r e in , 
1 6 . D u r i n g t h e t r i a l p l a i n t i f f h e r e i n a d d u c e d no 
e v i d e n c e t h a t he had a c o l o r a b l e or m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e to the 
a l l e g a t i o n s M o r r i s o n made a g a i n s t him in c a s e number C-80-8309. 
Accord ing ly , P l a i n t i f f Wil l iams has made no showing t h a t had Barbe; 
t i m e l y f i l e d an answer t h e r e i n , he , Wi l l i ams , could have p reva i l ec> 
on the mer i t s . 
1 7 . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e $ 5 0 0 . 0 0 he p a i d to B a r b e r , 
p l a i n t i f f p a i d $ 5 0 0 . 0 0 in i n i t i a l a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s to M a r t i n 
B e c k e r ; $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 t o T e r r y C h r i s t e n s e n , C o a l v i l l e , U t a h , and 
$1,000.00 to Monte J . Morr is in a t t emp t s to s e t a s i d e the Judgments 
ob ta ined by Morr i son . 
18 . The e v i d e n c e adduced by p l a i n t i f f is i n s u f f i c i e n t 
to show by a preponderance tha t the loss of p l a i n t i f f ' s employment 
or t h e r e s u l t i n g r e d u c t i o n in h i s income, l o s s of h i s home, or 
h i s b a n k r u p t c y were p r o x i m a t e l y caused by the Judgment e n t e r e d 
as a r e s u l t of B a r b e r ' s n e g l e c t . Fur the rmore , the proofs of the 
sum of such damages of fered by p l a i n t i f f a re s p e c u l a t i v e in na tu re 
and, t h e r e f o r e , i n s u f f i c i e n t . 
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
hereby enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 
this action and personal jurisdiction over each of the defendants 
here in. 
2. Because plaintiff did not know of or rely upon any 
relationship between Martin Verhoef or David Yocom and Defendant 
Barber when he retained Barber, there is no basis upon which 
Verhoef or Yocom are liable for any damages suffered by plaintiff. 
Accordingly, judgment should be entered in favor of Defendant 
Verhoef and Yocom, no cause of action. 
3. Barber was negligent in failing to timely answer 
the Complaint in case number C-80-8309 in this Court, and his said 
conduct constituted legal malpractice for which judgment should 
be entered against him for such damages as were proximately caused 
thereby. 
4. There is no basis under Utah law for an award of 
general damages for pain, suffering, or emotional distress under 
the facts of this case. 
5. Because plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence that loss of plaintiff Ts job, the reduction of 
earnings or mortgage foreclosure resulting thereform or his 
bankruptcy were proximately caused by the negligent conduct of 
Defendant Barber, plaintiff should be awarded no damages therefor. 
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6. Because plaintiff was required to hire attorneys 
to attempt to set aside the Judgment in case number C-80-8309, 
judgment should be entered against Barber for the amount of such 
attorney's fees, i.e. $1,750.00 as well as the $500.00 retained 
paid to Barber. 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for his taxable 
costs herein. . 
Dated th is ft, day of (ML • , 1985. 
ATTEST 
H.D#ONHiNOLEY 
Clerfc 
Deputy Clerfc 
CERTIFICATE 
LICT/OQURT JUDGE 
LILING 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t I m a i l e d a copy of the foregoing 
F i n d i n g s of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pos tage p r e p a i d , to Monte 
J . M o r r i s , a t t o r n e y for p l a i n t i f f , a t P . O. Box 843, Henderson, 
Nevada 89015, t h i s ^ f f ^ d a y of QuUf 1985. 
**&&?* ^fa^U^. • * 
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-. -.M ot rni"^ O C T -
JAMES N. BARBER, #0198 
MARTIN VERHOEF, #3326 
DAVID E. YOOOM, #3581 
Attorneys at Law 
255 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-8998 
Oilt Uk2 County Utah 
WiGi2'235 
H p-xor i i^.jESWJC'.crk 3rd C.st. Court 
Deputy o»e> * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL,DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DALVIN J. WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES N. BARBER, MARTIN 
VERHOEF, and DAVID E. YOCOM, 
partners in the lawfirm of 
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 82-4887 
) 
The captioned matter came on regularly for trial before 
the Honorable Dennis J. Frederick, District Judge, sitting without 
a jury, on May,14, 1985. Plaintiff was represented by Monte J. 
Morris, Esq. Defendants each appeared pro se. 
Evidence was taken and arguments were heard, the Court 
has heretofore made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. Based thereon, and good cause appearing: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants Martin 
Verhoef and David E. Yocom against the plaintiff, no cause of 
act ion. 
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2. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff against 
Defendant James N. Barber for the sum of $2,250.00, together with 
the sum of $634.46 representing plainti/f's taxable costs herein. 
Dated this U/ day of fMk' , 1985. 
BY TI^ E COWT: 
ATTEST 
KDIXpNHINDLEY 
/) Clerk 
/A 
By Deputy Clerk 
MAILING 'CERTIFICA' 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y that a true and c o r r e c t copy of the 
f o r e g o i n g Judgment was m a i l e d , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , to Mr. Monte J. 
M o r r i s , a t t o r n e y for p l a i n t i f f , P.O. Box 843 , Henderson, Nevada 
89015, on th i s y&'^Ajay of C ? ^ £ v , 1985. 
BARTHOLOMEW v. CROCKETT 
Cite as 475 N.E~2d 1035 (IlLApp. 1 Dist. 1985) 
ill- 1035 
that's a matter of record here, where the 
only defense that is being alleged here is 
one used as a mitigating factor. It says 
here, that the affirmative defense of in-
toxication is a mitigating factor. De-
fendant does not claim that it deprived 
him of substantial capacity to distinguish 
between criminal conduct or conform-
ance of his conduct within the require-
ments of law/' 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment 
and sentence of the circuit court of Henry 
County is reversed and the cause remanded 
with directions that the defendant be given 
a new trial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
HEIPLE, 
cur. 
PJ., and STOUDER, J., con-
= KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
"I just want to make sure that so I don't 
have to argue that you're not alleging 
voluntary intoxication as an affirmative 
defense, just saying use it in mitiga-
tion?" 
Defense counsel made the following state-
ment in final argument: 
"No question whatsoever. I certainly 
feel this is a mitigating factor in any 
determination by the Court. We're deal-
ing with general intent crimes rather 
than specific intent. Consequently, I'm 
aware of the differentiation there, your 
Honor. However, I would request the 
Court to take that into consideration." 
[3] The action of defense counsel in at-
tempting to use clear evidence of the de-
fendant's intoxication only in mitigation 
amounted to only the formality of a trial 
since he had already in effect pleaded his 
client guilty, without his knowledge or con-
sent. (People v. Stepheny (1974), 56 I11.2d 
237, 306 N.E.2d 872.) By merely going 
through the motions of an adversary pro-
ceeding, counsel for the defendant ceased 
to be an advocate for the accused and 
defendant's right to the presumption of 
innocence was compromised to the point 
that the result was a foregone conclusion. 
[4] No matter how strong the State's 
evidence may be, counsel for the defendant 
must (1) either advise his client to plead 
guilty and obtain his knowing and volun-
tary acquiescence in such a plea, (2) be a 
vigorous advocate in his client's defense, or 
(3) withdraw from the case. Nothing more 
is required of a lawyer, and nothing less is 
owed to a defendant. 
*> 
131 Ill.App.3d 456 
86 Ill.Dec. 656 
Jane BARTHOLOMEW, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Lavert CROCKETT, David Wittenberg, 
Paul A. Caghan, and Wittenberg & Ca-
ghan, Ltd., a Professional Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 83-2401. 
Appellate Court of Illinois, 
First District, Third Division. 
March 6, 1985. 
State employee brought action against 
employee of the Board of Trustees of the 
University of Illinois for personal injuries 
sustained as result of motor vehicle colli-
sion and against former attorneys for mal-
practice in handling the claim. The Circuit 
Court of Cook County, Myron Gomberg, J., 
dismissed the complaint as to all defend-
ants, and plaintiff appealed. The Appellate 
Court, White, P.J., held that: (1) Board 
employee was not immune from state em-
ployee's common-law negligence claim 
against him, and (2) while plaintiff's claim 
against the Board for personal injuries was 
precluded because of defendant attorneys' 
failure to timely file statutory notice of 
claim, such failure did not deprive plaintiff 
of a cause of action against Board employ-
ee and, since it was not yet determined 
whether plaintiff could recover against 
1036 HI- 475 NORTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Board employee, it was impossible to ascer-
tain whether attorneys' negligent conduct 
resulted in actual damage to plaintiff and 
thus, without the element of actual dam-
ages, cause of action for legal malpractice 
had not yet accrued. 
Reversed and remanded in part and 
affirmed in part. 
1. Workers' Compensation <3>2168 
Employee employed by Board of Trus-
tees of the University of Illinois was not an 
employee of the state for purposes of pro-
vision of the Workers' Compensation Act 
precluding common-law action against a 
coemployee if the parties come within the 
Act and thus, Board employee wras not 
immune from state employee's common-law 
negligence claim against him for injuries 
allegedly sustained in motor vehicle acci-
dent which occurred while both employees 
were acting in the scope of their employ-
ment. S.H.A. ch. 48, H 138.5(a). 
2. Automobiles <3>232 
A state employee cannot use govern-
mental immunity as a shield to preclude 
circuit court jurisdiction in automobile neg-
ligence cases. 
3. Automobiles <3=>232 
Coverage of state employee and the 
vehicle by a state-sponsored insurance pro-
gram had no jurisdictional effect on the 
court in which" negligence action was to be 
asserted against state employee for inju-
ries sustained in motor vehicle accident 
which occurred while employee was acting 
in the scope of his employment. 111.Rev. 
Stat.1979, ch. 127, U 35.9(/)(3). 
4. States <S=>79 
State employees are not exempt from 
liability for their own acts of negligence 
merely because they were acting within the 
scope of their employment. 
5. Attorney and Client <3=>129(2» 
In order to state a cause of action for 
legal malpractice, the plaintiff must plead 
the existence of an attorney/client relation-
ship; a duty arising from that relationship; 
a breach of that duty; causation and actual 
damages. 
6. Attorney and Client <3=>129(2) 
Burden of pleading and proving that 
damages resulted from attorney's legal 
malpractice entails establishing that but 
for the attorney's negligence, the client 
would have successfully defended or prose-
cuted the underlying suit 
7. Action <s=>61 
.While client's claim against Board of 
Trustees of the University of Illinois for 
personal injuries sustained in automobile 
accident was precluded because of her for-
mer attorneys' failure to timely file statuto-
ry notice of claim, such failure did not 
deprive client of cause of action against 
Board's employee who was driver of auto-
mobile, and since it had not yet been deter-
mined whether client could recover against 
Board employee, it was impossible to ascer-
tain whether attorneys' negligent conduct 
resulted in actual damages to client and 
thus, without the element of actual dam-
ages, client's cause of action for legal mal-
practice had not yet accrued. 
Baskin, Server, Berke & Weinstein, Chi-
cago (Susan P. Malone, Chicago, of coun-
sel), for plaintiff-appellant 
Neil Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago (Wil-
liam R. Wallin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, 
of counsel), for defendant-appellee, Lavert 
Crockett. 
Conklin & Adler, Ltd., Chicago (John S. 
Roadhouse and Peter V. Bustamante, Chi-
cago, of counsel), for defendants-appellees 
David Wittenberg, Paul A. Caghan and 
Wittenberg & Caghan, Ltd. 
WHITE, Presiding Justice. 
Jane Bartholomew brought this action 
against defendant, Lavert Crockett, for 
personal injuries sustained as a result of a 
motor vehicle collision and against her for-
mer attorneys, Paul Caghan, David Witten-
berg and Wittenberg & Caghan, Ltd. (At-
torneys), for malpractice in handling the 
aforementioned claim. Appellant's two-
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to all defendants. 
The amended complaint alleges that on 
June 2, 1980, Bartholomew was driving her 
automobile in the course of her employ-
ment as a nurse inspector for the Illinois 
Department of Public Health, going to one 
of the nursing homes where she was as-
signed. She was proceeding in a westerly 
direction on Taylor Street in Chicago. She 
had come to a complete stop behind traffic 
to allow another vehicle to make a left turn 
when her car wras struck from the rear by 
a motor vehicle driven by Crockett. At the 
time of the collision Crockett was operating 
a State-owned vehicle in the course of his 
employment as a truck driver for the Uni-
versity of Illinois. As a result of the colli-
sion, Bartholomew alleges that her car was 
damaged and that she sustained extensive 
injuries. 
The amended complaint further alleges 
that on or about June 3, 1980, Bartholomew 
retained David Wittenberg and Paul Ca-
ghan of the law firm of Wittenberg and 
Caghan, Ltd. to represent her in all claims 
arising out of the above-mentioned occur-
rence, against the State of Illinois as her 
employer for worker's compensation and 
against Crockett and his employer for his 
negligence. Thereafter Bartholomew en-
tered into two retainer agreements which 
provided for payment to the Attorneys of 
20 percent of the award from the Industrial 
Commission for worker's compensation 
claims and for payment of 40 percent of 
the recovery on all other claims. 
On January 8, 1981, the Attorneys filed a 
statutory notice of claim for personal inju-
ries against the State of Illinois in the 
Illinois Court of Claims. This claim was 
filed late, more than eight days beyond the 
time allowed by statute and named the 
State as the defendant instead of the Board 
of Trustees of the University of Illinois. 
The Attorneys later filed a complaint in the 
Court of Claims for property damages 
only, identifying Crockett as an agent of 
the State. Further, the Attorneys filed a 
worker's compensation claim against the 
State of Illinois as Bartholomew's employ-
her property damage 
claim against the State of Illinois, instruct-
ing her to execute a general release in 
favor of the State and Crockett. 
Subsequently, Bartholomew became dis-
satisfied with the Attorneys' overall per-
formance and discharged them upon learn-
ing that they had filed an untimely statuto-
ry notice of claim. She then retained the 
attorney who is representing her in this 
appeal. 
Bartholomew's amended complaint in 
count I alleged that Crockett was negligent 
in speeding, failing to retain control of his 
vehicle, and otherwise operating his vehicle 
in a negligent manner. In count II of her 
complaint, she charged that the appellee 
Attorneys failed to file a proper notice of 
claim with the Court of Claims, negligently 
advised plaintiff to sign a general release, 
and improperly named the State of Illinois 
rather than the Board of Trustees of the 
University of Illinois as the employer of 
Crockett. 
The trial judge granted Crockett's mo-
tion to dismiss on the basis that Bartholo-
mew and Crockett were co-employees, each 
acting within the scope of his employment 
at the time of the incident, and that the 
action is barred by section 5(a) of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. (111.Rev.Stat. 
1979, ch. 48, par. 138.5.) The judge grant-
ed the Attorneys' motion on the grounds 
that plaintiff failed to state a cause of 
action for malpractice because she had suf-
fered no damages as a result of the alleged 
negligence of the Attorneys. This appeal 
followed. 
Bartholomew argues that the trial court 
erred in dismissing her claims because (1) 
the Board of Trustees of the University of 
Illinois is separate and distinct from the 
State of Illinois for purposes of section 5(a) 
of the Worker's Compensation Act, (2) an 
employee of the Board is not immune from 
claims based on his negligent operation of 
a motor vehicle because the injured party is 
employed by the State of Illinois, and (3) 
she stated a cause of action against her 
former attorneys for legal malpractice. 
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II] The first issue to be considered is 
whether the Board of Trustees of the Uni-
versity of Illinois is a legal persona sepa-
rate from the State of Illinois. We note 
that at the time of the incident, both Bar-
tholomew and Crockett were acting in the 
scope of their employment. Bartholomew 
contends that Crockett is not an employee 
of the State because the Board is a legal 
entity separate and distinct from the State 
of Illinois; and that the Board and the 
State are not the same employer for pur-
poses of section 5(a) of the Worker's Com-
pensation Act. She therefore asserts that 
Crockett is not immune from suit on a 
common law negligence claim by her. We 
agree. 
Section 5(a) of the Worker's Compensa-
tion Act provides in pertinent part: 
§ 5. (a) No common law or statutory 
right to recover damages from the em-
ployer, * * * or employees * * * for in-
jury or death sustained by any employee 
while engaged in the line of his duty as 
such employee, other than the compensa-
tion herein provided, is available to any 
employee who is covered by the provi-
sions of this Act * * *. 
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a).) 
The Illinois Supreme Court has construed 
this section to mean a common law action 
against a co-employee is precluded if the 
parties come within the act and the acciden-
tal injury arose out of and in the course of 
the employment. Chmelik v. Vana (1964), 
31 I11.2d 272, 201 N.E.2d 434; Brooks v. 
Carter (1981), 102 Ill.App.3d 635, 58 111. 
Dec. 534, 430 N.E.2d 566. 
It is uncontested that Bartholomew is an 
employee of the State of Illinois. The 
question here is whether the Board of 
Trustees of the University of Illinois, which 
employed Crockett, can be considered the 
State of Illinois under section 5(a) of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. On numer-
ous occasions, Illinois courts have dis-
cussed the status of the university in rela-
tion to the State. The Board has been 
described as a public corporation, endowed 
1. Section 19f of the Worker's Compensation Act 
precludes judicial review b\ the circuit court of 
with all the powers and duties of public 
i  corporations and was established by the 
legislature for the purpose of conducting 
 and operating the university. People ex 
rel Board of Trustees v. Barrett (1943), 
 382 111. 321, 46 N.E.2d 951; Spalding v. 
v People (1898), 172 111. 40, 49 N.E. 993. 
e
 In Barrett, our supreme court examined 
1
 at length the relationship between the 
B
 Board and the State. It held that the 
9
 Board, as a corporation, was distinct and 
separate from the State. The court con-
cluded that the university is not a State 
^ agency but an agent for the State. "The 
1
 distinction, while subtle, is very real * * * 
3
 [b]oth State agencies and agents for the 
State are created by the legislature, but the 
former are governmental in nature while 
the latter are proprietary or administra-
/ tive." (Decker v. University Civil Service 
 System Merit Board (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 
- 208, 40 Itt.Dec. 472, 406 N.E.2d 173.) The 
> Barrett court described the status of the 
> Board as follows: 
[The Board] functions solely as an agen-
r
 cy of the State for the purpose of the 
operation and administration of the uni-
versity, for the State. In doing this, it 
) functions as a corporation, separate 
I and distinct from the State and as a 
i public corporate entity with all the pow-
\ ers enumerated in the applicable stat-
utes, or necessarily incident thereto. It 
• has and can exercise no sovereign pow-
, ers. It is no part of the State or State 
government. (Emphasis added.) 
• (382 111. 321, 343, 46 N.E.2d 951.) More-
over, in Board of Trustees of the Universi-
i ty of Illinois v. Industrial Commission 
\ (1969), 44 I11.2d 207, 254 N.E.2d 522, the 
' Illinois Supreme Court considered the rela-
i tionship of the Board to its employees 
when the Board attempted to appeal to the 
circuit court an award of the Industrial 
Commission in favor of an employee. The 
employee argued that his claim against the 
Board was a claim against the State for 
purposes of section 19f 1 of the Worker's 
Compensation Act (111 Rev.Stat 1967, ch. 48, 
Industrial Commission decisions in all actions 
against the State o( Illinois 
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par. 138.19f(l).) The Board argued that it 
was not an agency of the State of Illinois, 
therefore not within the section 19f preclu-
sion. Our supreme court agreed, holding 
that claims by university employees were 
not the same as claims by State employees 
because the Board is a corporation separate 
and distinct from the State and subject to 
being sued as any public corporation. 
Thus, the Board and its employees, unlike 
the State or its employees, are permitted to 
appeal Industrial Commission decisions to 
the circuit court. 
The Barrett and Industrial Commis-
sion cases are not the only decisions in 
which the Board asserted that it is separate 
and distinct from the State of Illinois. Re-
cently, the Board asserted the same and 
the appellate court adopted the conclusion 
of the aforementioned decisions in McKen-
na v. Board of Trustees of the University 
of Illinois (1980), 90 Ill.App.3d 992, 46 111. 
Dec. 401, 414 N.E.2d 123, and Decker v. 
University Civil Service System Merit 
Board (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 208, 40 Ill.Dec. 
472, 406 N.E.2d 173. In these cases, non-
academic employees of the University of 
Illinois sought to obtain payment of pre-
vailing wages, contending they were either 
State employees, or at least employees of a 
State officer, agent or authority. The 
court in both cases held that the university 
is not an agency of the State within the 
meaning of the -Personnel Code (Ill.Rev. 
Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 391), but is "sepa-
rate and distinct from the State." McKen-
nay 90 Ill.App.3d 992, 996, 46 Ill.Dec. 401, 
414 N.E.2d 123; Decker, 85 Ill.App.3d 208, 
214, 40 Ill.Dec. 472, 406 N.E.2d 173. 
We conclude that Crockett, who is em-
ployed by the Board of Trustees of the 
University of Illinois, is not an employee of 
the State for purposes of section 5(a) of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. Accordingly, 
we hold that Bartholomew and Crockett 
are not co-employees within the meaning of 
section 5(a) of the Worker's Compensation 
Act, and that Crockett is not immune from 
Bartholomew's common law negligence 
claim against him. 
Crockett places great reliance on Ellis v. 
Board of Governors (1984), 102 I11.2d 387, 
80 Ill.Dec. 750, 466 N.E.2d 202; Williams 
v. Medical Center Commission (1975), 60 
I11.2d 389, 328 N.E.2d 1; and Kane v. 
Board of Governors (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 
315, 2 Ill.Dec. 53, 356 N.E.2d 1340, in sup-
port of his argument that the University of 
Illinois is a State agency. In these cases 
the Boards and the Commission were char-
acterized as "arms of the State of Illinois" 
(State agencies) for purposes of sovereign 
immunity, meaning that claims against 
these entities are cognizable exclusively in 
the Illinois Court of Claims pursuant to the 
Court of Claims Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 
37, par. 439.8(d).) In neither case was the 
court addressing the issue of whether em-
ployees of such entities are to be con-
sidered State co-employees. 
[2] Even assuming arguendo that 
Crockett is a State employee, his contention 
that all claims against him were required to 
be asserted in the Court of Claims is with-
out merit. "An Act in relation to immunity 
for the State of Illinois" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, 
ch. 127, par. 801), precludes the State, not 
individuals, from being sued in another fo-
rum; nor is Crockett within the exclusive 
jurisdictional purview of the Court of 
Claims (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 37, par. 439.-
8). The Illinois Appellate Court, on numer-
ous occasions, has held that non-govern-
mental activities of State employees can 
form the basis of a negligence action in the 
circuit court, and such claims are not re-
quired to be asserted in the Court of 
Claims. (Watson v. St. Annes Hospital 
(1979), 68 Ill.App.3d 1048, 25 Ill.Dec. 411, 
386 N.E.2d 885; Madden v. Kuehn (1978), 
56 Ill.App.3d 997, 14 Ill.Dec. 852, 372 
N.E.2d 1131.) Similarly, the court in Hoff-
man v. Yack (1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 744, 15 
Ill.Dec. 140, 373 N.E.2d 486, found that the 
Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois Uni-
versity could be sued only in the Court of 
Claims, but that this restriction did not 
apply to the employee defendant. 
More specifically, Illinois courts have 
held that a government employee cannot 
use governmental immunity as an affirma-
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tive defense or as a shield to preclude 
circuit court jurisdiction in automobile neg-
ligence cases. (Hering v. Hilton (1958), 12 
I11.2d 559, 147 N.E.2d 311; Gocheffv. State 
Community College (1979), 69 Ill.App.3d 
178, 25 Ill.Dec. 477, 386 N.E.2d 1141; Pree 
v. Hymbaugh (1959), 23 Ill.App.2d 211, 162 
N.E.2d 297.) The defendants in each case 
were operating motor vehicles on the public 
highway in a negligent manner. The opin-
ions in those cases, in effect, stated that 
the fact of government employment could 
not be used as a shield. The duty imposed 
on the defendants was held to be the same 
duty imposed on all other persons operat-
ing motor vehicles on the public highways. 
We believe this to be sound law. In Go-
cheffy the court specifically noted that: 
* * * [T]he acts of negligence alleged to 
have been committed by [defendant] re-
late not to obligations incurred solely by 
virtue of his employment with [the state 
community college], but rather to duties 
automobile drivers owe to one another. 
(69 Ill.App.3d at 184, 25 Ill.Dec. 477, 386 
N.E.2d 1141.) Accordingly, we hold that 
even if Crockett were a State employee, he 
could not use his employment as a shield 
against suit in the circuit court. 
Crockett contends further that a suit 
which involves the State's self insurance 
plan is a suit against the State and is 
cognizable solely in the Court of Claims. 
Conversely, Bartholomew argues that the 
circuit court does not lose jurisdiction mere-
ly because the Board participates in a 
State-sponsored insurance program which . 
insured Crockett and the vehicle driven by 
him. 
13,4J We believe the coverage of Crock-
ett and the vehicle by a State-sponsored 
insurance program has no jurisdictional ef-
fect. Generally, State employees 2 are not 
exempt from liability for their own acts of 
2. As a driver of a motor vehicle registered to the 
State, Crockett is considered a State employee 
only for purposes of section 35.9(h). Section 
35.9(h) defines employee, inter alia, as: 
* * * [A]ny other person while using a li-
censed motor vehicle owned, leased or con-
trolled by the State of Illinois with the autho-
rization of the State of Illinois, provided the 
negligence merely because they were act-
ing within the scope of their employment 
See Gocheff, 69 Ill.App.3d 178, 25 Ill.Dec 
477, 386 N.E.2d 1141; Watson, 68 111. 
App.3d 1048, 25 Ill.Dec. 411, 386 N.E.2d 
885; Madden, 56 Ill.App.3d 997, 14 Ill.Dec 
852, 372 N.E.2d 1131. 
Specifically, in Kaiser v. Emrich (1980), 
84 IU.App.3d 775, 40 Ill.Dec. 506, 406 
N.E.2d 207, the defendant was a State 
trooper who was involved, while on duty, in 
an automobile collision in which plaintiffs 
were injured. The trooper moved to dis-
miss the complaint on the grounds that the 
circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion, relying upon section 35.9(m)(3) of the 
Civil Administrative Code (Ill.Rev.Stat. 
1977, ch. 127, par. 35.9(m)(3)), the predeces-
sor of section 35.9(/)(3) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, 
ch. 127, par. 35.9(0(3)), which is applicable 
here.3 The circuit court refused to dismiss 
the complaint, and the appellate court af-
firmed. The court noted that the statute in 
question concerns two situations: 
The first involves suits in tort against a 
State employee operating a vehicle cover-
ed by State self-insurance provisions; in 
this situation, the State shall defend, in-
demnify and hold the employee harmless 
against the tort claim, in any proper judi-
cial forum. The second situation ex-
pressly involves claims against the State 
as a self-insurer, and requires those 
claims to be brought in the Court of 
Claims. 
(Kaiser, 84 Ill.App.3d at 776, 40 Ill.Dec. 
506, 406 N.E.2d 207.) The Kaiser court 
found that in the former case, jurisdiction 
was proper in the circuit court, while in the 
latter, the Court of Claims might have sole 
jurisdiction. 
Crockett contends that the Kaiser case is 
inapplicable because section 35.9(m) was 
amended subsequent to the holding in Kai-
actual use thereof is within trie scope of such 
authorization and within the course of State 
service. 
Hl.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 127, par. 35.9(h). 
3. Section 35.9(0 is presently cited as Ill-Rev. 
Stat. 1983, ch. 127, par. 63b4("k). 
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ser. We disagree. Although there are nu-
merous amendments to the provision, the 
General Assembly retained the provision 
that "the State of Illinois shall defend, in-
demnify and hold harmless such employee 
against any claim in tort filed against such 
employee for acts or omissions within the 
scope of his employment in any proper 
judicial forum * * *." (Emphasis added.) 
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 127, par. 35.9.) It 
was this provision as well as the one refer-
ring to the Court of Claims upon which the 
Kaiser court relied. • Crockett's interpreta-
tion of the statute would render the "any 
proper judicial forum" provision meaning-
less if the claims could only be filed in the 
Court of Claims. We do not believe the 
legislature intended its amendments to ren-
der that provision meaningless. 
Crockett argues in his brief that Bartho-
lomew's execution of a general release of 
claims against him and the State of Illinois 
bars this suit. We note that the under-
standing of the parties was that the release 
concerned only the claims for property 
damage. Nevertheless, Crockett raised the 
issue of the release as a defense. The 
record shows, however, that on February 
22, 1983, Crockett withdrew the issue of 
the release from consideration by the court 
and the release is therefore not an issue in 
this appeal. 
Lastly, Bartholomew argues that the 
court erred in dismissing her legal malprac-
tice claim against her former attorneys and 
in ordering summary judgment in the At-
torneys' favor. 
A motion for summary judgment will be 
granted if the pleadings, depositions and 
admissions on file together with affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. (Federal Deposit Insur. Corp. v. 
Maris (1984), 121 Ill.App.3d 894, 77 Ill.Dec. 
311, 460 N.E.2d 367.) We believe the At-
torneys' right to summary judgment is 
clear and free from doubt. Turk v. Village 
of Willow Springs (1983), 120 IU.App.3d 
800, 76 Ill.Dec. 478, 458 N.E.2d 1132. 
475 N E 26—24 
[5] In order to state a cause of action 
for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must 
plead the existence of an attorney/client 
relationship; a duty arising from that rela-
tionship; a breach of that duty; causation 
and actual damages. Cook v. Gould 
(1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 311, 64 Ill.Dec. 896, 
440 N.E.2d 448; Chicago Red Top Cab 
Ass'n. v. Gaines (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 332, 7 
Ill.Dec. 167, 364 N.E.2d 328; Trustees of 
Schools v. Schroeder (1971), 2 Ill.App.3d 
1009, 278 N.E.2d 431. 
[6] Since damage is an element of a 
professional malpractice claim that is not 
presumed, Bartholomew bears the burden 
of pleading and proving that damages re-
sulted. This burden entails establishing 
that "but for" the attorneys' negligence, 
the client would have successfully defend-
ed or prosecuted the underlying suit. Zych 
v. Jones (1980), 84 Ill.App.3d 647, 40 111. 
Dec. 369, 406 N.E.2d 70; Miller v. Schultz 
(1977), 53 IlLApp.3d 721, 11 Ill.Dec. 533, 
368 N.E.2d 1141. 
[7] We agree that Bartholomew's claim 
against the Board for personal injuries is 
precluded because of her former attorneys' 
failure to file timely statutory notice of 
claim. However, this failure did not de-
prive Bartholomew of a cause of action for 
her personal injuries against Crockett. As 
we have held in this appeal, she has a valid 
cause of action against him for her person-
al injuries. 
Since it is yet to be determined (by the 
trial court in her revived claim) whether 
Bartholomew may recover against Crock-
ett, it is impossible to ascertain whether 
the Attorneys' negligent conduct resulted 
in actual damages to her. Bartholomew 
will have sustained actual damages for a 
cause of action in legal malpractice only 
after she fails to recover or fails to fully 
recover on her personal injury claim 
against Crockett or if the release defense, 
which is not before us, is ultimately sus-
tained. 
On this basis, Bartholomew, in her com-
plaint, failed to meet her burden of plead-
ing sufficient facts showing that damages 
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resulted from the Attorneys' failure to file 
timely the statutory notice of claim for 
personal injuries against the Board of Trus-
tees of the University of Illinois. (Zych, 84 
Ill.App.3d 647, 40 Ill.Dec. 369, 406 N.E.2d 
70.) Without the element of actual dam-
ages, Bartholomew's cause of action for 
legal malpractice has not yet accrued and is 
therefore non-existent. (Schroeder, 2 111. 
App.3d 1009, 278 N.E.2d 431.) According-
ly, we hold that the court below properly 
found that Bartholomew failed to show 
that she suffered any damages as a result 
of the Attorneys' conduct and summary 
judgment for the Attorneys was properly 
granted. 
For the aforementioned reasons, we re-
verse the summary judgment entered for 
defendant in count I and remand; and we 
affirm the summary judgment entered for 
defendants in count II. 
REVERSED and REMANDED IN PART 
and AFFIRMED IN PART. 
McGILLICUDDY and RIZZI, JJ., concur. 
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James G. POSKOZIM, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
MONNACEP, Dave Jacobs, Maine Town-
ship High School District 207, James 
Miglore Niles Township High School 
District 219, Northfield Township High 
School District 225, Oakton Communi-
ty College District 535, and Sky Sports, 
Inc., Defendants-Appellees. 
Nos. 83-1594, 83-2185. 
Appellate Court of Illinois, 
First District, Fourth Division. 
March 7, 1985. 
Adult parachute student, uho was in-
jured v*hile making parachute jump, 
brought action against joint venture of 
school districts and community college dis-
trict which offered course as part of adult 
education program, corporation which pro-
vided course, and individual instructors and 
supervisors. Defendants filed motion to 
dismiss complaint. The Circuit Court, 
Cook County, Myron T. Gomberg, J., grant-
ed motion and appeal was taken. The Ap-
pellate Court, Jiganti, P.J., held that excul-
patory agreement signed by adult student 
was unambiguous and exonerated all defen-
dants from liability arising out of skydiving 
class. 
Affirmed. 
1. Contracts <s>114 
Where exculpatory agreement specifi-
cally set forth in clear language range of 
activities to which it applied and parties to 
be included thereunder, exculpatory agree-
ment signed by adult student parachutist 
was enforceable as to claims based on neg-
ligence. 
2. Contracts <s=>189 
If there was any misconduct on part of 
school districts offering adult education 
parachuting program, and their instructors, 
in their adult approval of adult student's 
use of boots for parachute jump, such con-
duct was instructional, and therefore, as ex-
culpatory agreement signed by student who 
broke his leg on first jump was explicit in its 
exculpation of all matters having to do with 
instructions, approval of boots formed no 
b&sis of liability on part of school districts 
and other defendants. 
3. Contracts <£=114 
Exculpatory agreements are strictly 
construed, and agreement protecting one 
from consequences of his own negligence 
must be expressed in clear, explicit and 
unequivocal language showing that such 
was intent of parties. 
4. Release <S=>29(1) 
Where exculpatory agreement signed 
by adult student parachutist specificalh ex-
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Marvin YOUNG and Stella Young, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Apoeliants, 
v. 
George BRIDWELL, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 10774. 
Supremo Comt of Utah 
Feb 20, 10GS 
Clients sued attorne> for damages al-
legedly caused by failure to properly per-
form his duties for them. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M. 
Hanson, J , entered judgment for attorney, 
and clients appealed The Supreme Court, 
Anderson, District Judge, held that where it 
did not appear that judgment of district 
court would be re\ersed on appeal with any 
degree of assurance by adhering to ordmarv 
standards of professional competence, the~e 
was no affirmatne duty upon attorney to 
advise his clients to take an appeal, and 
where there was no agreement with or indi-
cation from clients that appeal should be 
taken, attorney could not bz liable for any 
damages that might ha\ e resuhed from fail-
ure to take appeal. 
Affirmed. 
1. Attorney and Client C=>! 15 
One employing another to perform 
some work requiring special skill, such as an 
attorney, though chcnt is by that contract 
entitled to attorneys personal services and 
to refuse those of an associate, must be he'd 
to have waived right to attorneys personal 
assistance where facts show attendance 
with an associate, without objection, at a 
hearing or trial where services contemplat-
ed by their employment contract were to be 
rendered. 
2. Evidence C=>5(2) 
It is well known generally that law>ers 
# office together and cooperate and assist one 
another at times in working on their cases. 
3. Attorney and Client C=>l 15 
Clients who allowed associate of attor-
ne> hired b) clients to appear at trial and to 
represent him without objection waned 
r ^ht to be represented by the one with 
whom contract was first made. 
4. Attorney and Client C=>1I5 
If there was am deficiency in prepara-
tion b^v office associate of attorney at time 
of pretrial and breach of contract for repre-
senfa*ion b\ associate in assigning it to him 
for handling without consent of clients, it 
was rot actionable in and of itself because 
trial court ga\ e associate opportunity to re-
Mew 't at trial whe^ his assistance was ac-
quiesced in by clients 
5. Attorney and Client <Ol29(2) 
In order to make out cause of action 
against attorney for failing to advise clients 
of their nght to appeal, it would have to be 
shown that there wras at least a reasonable 
like! hood of reversing the judgment and 
that reversal would have benefited the 
chents 
6. Landlord and Tenant 0 8 6 ( 2 ) 
\ \ here lease contains clause granting 
lessee option to require of lessor an exten-
sion of Wsc period, but subject to arbitra-
tion so far as rent is concerned and where 
leasee gives notice of intention to exercise 
right of extension, this is binding on lessor 
in so far as term of lease is concerned. 
7. Landlord and Tenant C=>86(4) 
Where rate of rental is subject to arbi-
tration and lessor has given notice of refus-
al to accept old rate of rental and advised 
that failure to agree to proposed increase 
would result in actuation of action pending 
to terminate lease, mere acceptance of 
monthl> rental at old rate would not in and 
of lt^ eU" ncccssanh constitute waiver of his 
right to negotiate new rate of rental as lease 
provide:. 
8. Attorney and Client <©=»! 12 
Where clients made no indication that 
attorne> was to represent them on appeal, 
attorne> is under no obligation to pursue an 
appeal on behalf of his client. 
9. Attorney and Client C=»I09 
If it was established that trial court had 
e itered a ruling manifestly against general 
law on subject, as determined by Supreme 
Court, or in contravention of express statu-
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lory or constitutional provision, and this 
fact was discoverable upon reasonable 
professional research by counsel, upon such 
a showing a duty conceivably might arise on 
part of counsel at least to so inform his 
client even though there was no agreement 
or indication that attorney was to represent 
client on appeal. 
10. Attorney and Client <S=>107 
Counsel is required to possess ordinary 
legal knowledge and skill common to mem-
bers of his profession, but he is not required 
to know all of the law, nor to second guess 
trial judge. 
11. Attorney and Client <&=! 12 
Where it did not appear that judgment 
of district court would be reversed on ap-
peal with any degree of assurance by adher-
ing to ordinary standards of professional 
competence, there was no affirmative duty 
upon attorney to advise his clients to take 
an appeal and where there was no agree-
ment with or indication from clients that 
appeal should be taken, attorney could not 
be liable for any damages that might have 
resulted from failure to take appeal. 
Stewart, Topham & Harding, Ray M. 
Harding, Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Salt Lake City for 
respondent. 
ANDERSON, District Judge. 
The plaintiffs Young sue defendant 
George Bridwell for damages allegedly 
caused by his failure to properly perform 
his duties for them as a lawyer. Upon a 
trial to the court judgment was rendered 
against the plaintiffs and they appeal. 
The plaintiffs engaged Mr. Bridwell to 
represent them in a case the facts of which 
a r e in summary as follows: 
Marvin and Stella Young, his wife, plain-
tiffs herein, on April 4, 1959, purchased the 
property at 4430 South 9th East from An-
thony and Mary Baker. The projperty at 
that time was subject to a lease to F. Hyde 
and Betty Lucille Mortensen, dated August 
10, 1957, for a period of five years, and re-
newable at the option of the lessee, except 
that the rent was subject to arbitration for 
the second five year period. 
On September 27, 1961, said Youngs sued 
the lessees, the Mortensens seeking to ter-
minate the lease because of alleged viola-
tions of the lease agreement by said lessees. 
At the time of the filing of this complaint, 
Mr. Tom Metos and Mr. Mark Miner, attor-
neys, represented them. An answer was 
filed for defendants November 3, 1961, by 
Mr. Bernard Rose, attorney. A reply was -< 
filed by Mr. Metos and Mr. Miner Novem-
ber 8, 1961. With the case at issue nothing 
further happened until March, 1962, when 
plaintiffs' attorneys gave notice of taking 
the deposition of the defendants. 
On August 24, 1962, a withdrawal of 
counsel was effected with notice given to all 
concerned. George Bridwell became attor-
ney of record and apparently had already 
rendered services prior to the filing of the 
withdrawal. The file shows by affidavit of 
the plaintiffs that defendants Mortensen by 
their attorney, Bernard Rose, gave notice of 
intention to continue to occupy the premises 
under the lease by a letter to Mr. Bridwell 
in July of 1962, prior to the expiration of 
the five-year term of the lease. The terms 
of the letter offered the same rent of $150 a 
month, or, if refused, proposed that as pro-
vided in the lease the amount be arbitrated. 
Mr. Bridwell, according to the affidavit, 
responded in behalf of plaintiffs Young by 
a letter indicating that the lease could be re-
newed for an additional five-year period 
only if it w as agreed they would pay as rent 
the sum of $450 a month, and if not accepta-
ble, that the letter was to be considered a 
notice to quit the premises by the end of the 
lease period, to-wit, August 10, 1962. The 
letter further warned that if this arrange-
ment was not accepted the suit to terminate 
the lease filed September 27, 1961, that 
would be activated. 
There is no evidence that any response 
was made to this last letter, or that the par-
ties did anything further to explore arbitra-
tion to resolve the amount of the rent. Sub-
sequently, payments of $150 per month were 
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accepted by the plaintiffs Young without 
further objection up to the ultimate date of 
trial on January 7, 1963. 
A pretrial of the matter was held on Nov-
ember 30, 1962, at which time the Youngs 
were represented by Mr. BridweH's office 
associate, Mr. Alan D. Frandsen. The rec-
ord does not show that his appearance was 
made with them present or that they had ex-
pressly or impliedly consented to or ac-
quiesced in their being represented at that 
time by him. Judge Ellett's pretrial order 
ruled that as a matter of law the acceptance 
of the first rental payment after August 10, 
1962, constituted a renewal of the lease for 
a new period of five years as allowed in the 
option in the lease. The court was not ad-
vised at the pretrial, so far as the record 
discloses, of the exchange of letters between 
counsel on the question of renewal ^ nd the 
rent to be charged, nor of an order purport-
edly prepared by Alan D. Frandsen, order-
ing that the rental payments of $150 be paid 
into court. There is no evidence such an 
order was signed, but it must be assumed 
from the tenor of thelast-referred-t0 order 
that Mr. Frandsen knew of it and had in 
mind getting the order signed to avoid any 
legal inference that might arise of waiver 
of the right to negotiate the renewal of the 
lease and/or the rate of the rent if the pay-
ments were received and kept by the 
Youngs. The evidence indicates that the 
Youngs did continue to receive ths rental 
payments at the old rate. 
At the trial of the matter on January 7, 
1963, Mr. Frandsen represented the Youngs 
without objection on their part so fa*- as the 
record is concerned. At this tirne Mr. 
Frandsen took issue with the trial Court on 
its ruhng at the pretrial that acceptance of 
the rent constituted a renewal of the lease 
at the old terms. The court acknowledged 
that it could reconsider the ruling n^ade at 
the pretrial hearing and asked Mr. Fi-andsen 
for law to the contrary. He cited SQme au-
thority and then had a discussion with the 
court off the record. The court tc)0k the 
matter under advisement. At the conclu-
sion of the trial the court stated that it was 
still of the opinion that it would be immater-
ial to grant Mr. Frandsen's request to 
amend the pretrial order. The issue of 
whether or not there was a breach of the 
lease the judge handled by saying: "I still 
think that by accepting the payment that he 
would have waived that, even had it been a 
breach." 
On February 23, 1965, the Youngs filed 
suit against Mr. George Bridwell claiming 
breach of contract in representing them. It 
was claimed that his negligence and that of 
Mr. Frandsen's in the way the suit against 
the Mortensens was handled, and his failure 
to appeal the court's-claimed erroneous rul-
ing, or to fail to advise them of the court's 
error, and/or to advise them to appeal, 
caused them to lose the right to renegotiate 
the rate of rental of the lease during the ex-
tended period to their damage in the sum of 
$15,000. On November 4, 1966, Judge 
Stewart Hanson ruled in this suit that the 
action should be dismissed. 
In the suit to terminate the lease, on Oc-
tober 31, 1966, Judge Stewart Hanson heard 
a motion to strike judgment and for new 
hearing, argued by Ray M. Harding for 
plaintiffs and Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., for 
defendant. The court denied the motion 
and found that an appeal would have been 
of no avail to plaintiffs and that therefore 
plaintiffs were barred from seeking recov-
ery in this action against Mr. Bridwell. 
From the foregoing it clearly appears that 
while Mr. Frandsen may not have been asv 
well apprised of the facts at the time of pre-
trial as Mr. Bridwell, the court gave him op-
portunity at the trial to argue whether or 
not payment and receipt of rent at the old 
rate was conclusive of the matter. He cited 
authorities supporting a view opposite to the 
view taken by the judge, and the judge 
nonetheless did not change his view. This 
result was reached at a hearing at which the 
Youngs were present. The record discloses 
no objection on their part to representation 
by Mr. Frandsen. 
[1-3] In no way is it disclosed by appel-
lants how Mr. Br id well's presence might 
have made the difference. But in any event 
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one employing another to perform some 
work requiring special skill, such as an at-
torney, though he is by that contract entitled 
to his personal services and to refuse those 
of an associate, must be held to have waived 
the right to his personal assistance where 
the facts show attendance with an associate, 
without objection, at a hearing or trial 
where services contemplated by their em-
ployment contract were to be rendered, as is 
the case here. One who appears at a den-
tist's office and finds his regular dentist is 
on vacation and has assigned the work to an 
associate in the office, and who then volun-
tarily permits the associate to proceed can 
hardly complain of breach of contract by 
the first. The same must apply to other 
professional services. It is well known gen-
erally that lawyers office together and 
cooperate and assist one another at times in 
working on their cases. While the services 
of an attorney are personal and* a client 
would be justified in refusing the assistance 
of an associate, such services as are know-
ingly accepted certainly constitute a waiver 
of the right to be assisted in those respects 
by the one with whom the contract was first 
made. 
[4] If there was any deficiency in the 
preparation of Mr. Frandsen at the time of 
pretrial and a breach of contract for repre-
sentation by Mr. Bridwell in assigning -it to 
him for handling without consent of the 
Youngs, it was not actionable in and of it-
self because the court, as explained above, 
gave Mr. Frandsen opportunity to review it 
at the trial when his assistance was ac-
quiesced in by the Youngs. The letters of 
Mr. Rose and Mr. Bridwell, written in July, 
1962, and exchanged in dispute over the re-
newal of the lease and the rate of rental, do 
not appear to have been mentioned to the 
court at the pretrial or trial, though bearing 
upon the subject. Of course, they could 
have been mentioned when the court was 
off the record. Nonetheless, they are not 
such facts as would reasonably appear to 
have had any influence on the court since 
payments at the old rate were made after 
the letters as claimed and the court said that 
437 P.2d—AA 
it was of the opinion that this fact of pay-
ment would be conclusive of the matter 
"even had it been a breach." In effect the 
court is saying that in its opinion even if 
plaintiff in the suit to terminate the lease 
could establish a breach, the acceptance of 
the payments would renew the lease at the 
old terms. 
[5] Appellants next contend that the 
court below erred in ruling that the results 
would not have been different on appeal in 
the original case and therefore an appeal 
would have been of no avail. The parties 
are not in disagreement that in order to 
make out a cause of action against the at-
torney for failing to advise of their right to 
appeal, it would have to be shown that there 
was at least a reasonable likelihood of re-
versing the judgment and that it would have 
benefited the plaintiff. Appellants in their 
brief cite authorities upon which they argue 
that where a lease contains an option on the 
part of the lessee to extend the lease for an 
additional period, but makes the rental sub-
ject to negotiation or arbitration, as in this 
case, receiving rentals at the old rate, par-
ticularly if there was any notice of the fact 
that lessor would not permit the old rate to 
continue, would not automatically extend 
the lease on the old terms. (45 A.L.R.2d 
827) 
[6-8] Where, as here, a lease contains a 
clause granting the lessee the option to re-
quire of the lessor an extension of the lease 
period, but subject to arbitration so far as 
the rent is concerned, and where the lessee 
gives notice of intention to exercise the 
right of extension, this is binding on the les~ 
sor insofar as the term of the lease is con-
cerned. Where, as here, the rate of rental 
is subject to arbitration, and the lessor has 
given notice of refusal to accept the old rate 
of rental and advised that failure to agree 
to the proposed increase would result in ac-
tivation of the action pending to terminate 
the lease, the mere acceptance of a monthly 
rental at the old rate would not in and of it-
self necessarily constitute a waiver of his 
right to negotiate a new rate of rental as the 
lease provides. It is unnecessary for us to 
6 9 0 Utah 437 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
be concerned however with whether the 
trial court's decision in the prior case might 
have been reversed, because even if that 
fact be assumed, there is another aspect of 
this case which supports the result reached 
by the trial judge in the instant case and 
precludes the plaintiff's recovery. This 
court has ruled in the Backman case (Lund-
berg v. Backman, 11 Utah 2d 330, 35S P.2d 
987) that an attorney is under no obligation 
to pursue an appeal on behalf of his client 
unless there has been some agreement or in-
dication from the client that the attorney 
was to represent him on appeal. There is 
no evidence in this instance that such was 
the case. 
[9,10] If it was established that the 
trial court had entered a ruling manifestly 
against the general law on the subject, as 
determined by our Supreme Court, or in 
contravention of express statutory or con-
stitutional provision, and this fact was dis-
coverable upon reasonable professional re-
search by counsel, upon such a showing a 
duty conceivably might arise on the part of 
counsel at least to so inform his client even 
though there was no agreement or indica-
tion the attorney was to represent the client 
on appeal. However, in this case there is 
no such established error giving rise to the 
duty of counsel to advise his client of the 
eight to appeal. Counsel is required to pos-
sess the ordinary legal knowledge and skill 
common to members of his profession, but 
he is not required to know all of the law, 
nor to second guess the trial judge. 
[11] Inasmuch as it is not made to ap-
pear in this case that by adhering to the or-
dinary standards of professional compe-
tence it could have been determined with 
any degree of assurance that the judgment 
of the district court in the prior case would 
be reversed, there was no affirmative duty 
upon the defendant attorney to advise his 
client to take an appeal, nor is it shown that 
there was any agreement with or indication 
from the client that the appeal should be 
taken. It therefore follows that the judg-
ment should be, and it is hereby affirmed. 
Costs to defendant (respondent). 
CROCKETT, C. J., CALLISTER and 
TUCKETT, JJ., and LEWIS JONES, Dis-
trict Judge, concur. 
HENRIOD, J., does not participate. 
ELLETT, J., being disqualified, does not 
participate. 
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Maxwell E. RICH, Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a mu-
nicipal corporation of the State of 
Utah, Defendant. 
No. II117. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 20, 100S. 
Original prohibition proceeding insti-
tuted by taxpayer to prevent Salt Lake City 
from acquiring and operating a mass transit 
system and from entering into contract with 
private bus lines for purchase of the system. 
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that 
statute providing that cities may construct, 
maintain and operate or purchase or lease 
street railways authorized city to acquire 
and operate the transportation system. 
Petition denied. 
Henriod and Callister, JJ., dissented. 
!. Municipal Corporations €=>273'/2 
Legislature by granting cities power to 
operate and acquire street railways intended 
to empower city to furnish public transpor-
tation of passengers over city streets by rail 
or otherwise; overruling Utah Rapid Tran-
sit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d 
1. U.C.A.1953, 10-S-14. 
2. Municipal Corporations C=>27V/2, 718 
Under statute providing that cities may 
construct, maintain and operate or purchase 
or lease street railways, Salt Lake City, a 
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4 Kan App 2d 36 
Raymond H. DINGS, Appellant, 
v. 
John CALLAHAN and Russel N. 
Barrett, Appellees. 
No. 50768. 
Court of Appeals of Kansas. 
Nov. 9, 1979. 
Review Denied Dec. 4, 1979. 
Ciient brought malpractice action 
against attorneys who represented him in 
connection with the property division aspect 
of a prior divorce proceeding. The Sedg-
wick District Court, Charles Stewart, J., 
assigned, entered summary judgment for 
the attorneys, and the client appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Rees, J., held that where 
a review of the record compelled the conclu-
sion that there was no possibility an appel-
late court would have reversed or found an 
abuse of discretion in the property division, 
the attorneys could not be held liable for 
legal malpractice for alleged failure to pros-
ecute an appeal or to advise the client that 
an appeal must be commenced within 30 
days. 
Affirmed. 
1. Attorney and Client <^ 129(4) 
Causally related damage is an essential 
element of a claim for legal malpractice. 
2. Attorney and Client e=> 129(2) 
An actionable claim against an attor-
ney for professional malpractice based on 
failure to prosecute an appeal or protect the 
client's rights to appeal requires proof that 
had a timely appeal been taken, a reversal 
or more favorable judgment would have 
resulted. 
3. Attorney and Client <3=>112 
Attorneys who represented husband in 
connection with property division aspect of 
divorce proceeding were not liable for legal 
malpractice for failure to prosecute an ap-
peal or protect husband's rights to appeal 
where there was no possibility that an ap-
pellate court would have reversed or found 
an abuse of discretion in the property divi-
sion. 
4. Judgment <3=»181(1) 
Where there is no material dispute as 
to the controlling issue, summary judgment 
is proper. 
Syllabus by the Court 
An actionable claim against an attor-
ney for professional malpractice asserting 
failure to prosecute an appeal or protect the 
client's rights to appeal from an unfavora-
ble judgment or order requires proof that 
had a timely appeal been taken, a reversal 
or more favorable judgment would have 
resulted. 
Fred W. Phelps, Jr., of Fred W. Phelps— 
Chartered, Topeka, for appellant. 
William Tinker, Jr., of McDonald, Tinker, 
Skaer, Quinn & Herrington, Wichita, for 
appellees. 
Before REES, P. J., and ABBOTT and 
SPENCER, JJ. 
REES, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse sum-
mary judgment in a malpractice action 
against two lawyers, Callahan and Barrett 
As the case comes before us, it is targeted 
at Barrett. There is no contention dis-
covery was incomplete. 
After representation by two other law-
yers in a Cowley County divorce action 
brought by his ex-wife in 1972, plaintiff 
contacted Barrett in November, 1975. It 
appears there then remained as part of the 
property division issue the question of equal 
division of seventeen jointly owned tracts 
of real estate, each of which was subject to 
a contract for sale. Barrett was contacted 
for the purpose of representing plaintiff at 
a hearing to be held on January 30, 1976, 
regarding the judicial distribution between 
plaintiff and his ex-wife of the sellers' in-
terests in the contracts. Callahan appeared 
for plaintiff at the hearing and we treat 
Callahan's appearance for plaintiff as hav-
ing been on behalf of Barrett 
tiary hearing was recessed. With and with-
out their clients present, counsel conferred 
concerning possible agreed distribution of 
the contracts. The hearing was adjourned 
upon the trial court being advised by coun-
sel a settlement had been reached. 
The direct evidence of record is that the 
trial judge was not informed of the pro-
posed terms of settlement. Plaintiff is of 
the belief and alleges the judge was told 
the terms. Even if this were true, it is of 
no significance in view of our disposition. 
Upon leaving the court house, Callahan 
and plaintiff discussed the proposed distri-
bution and plaintiff objected vehemently. 
Thereafter the ex-wife's counsel prepared 
and forwarded a proposed journal entry 
that was not approved and returned or 
presented to the court. In March, Barrett 
filed a motion for further hearing. It came 
on for hearing on April 30. At that hear-
ing, plaintiff testified in specific and com-
plete detail with regard to the unpaid prin-
cipal balance owed on each of the contracts 
and the gross amount of principal and inter-
est to be received on each contract assum-
ing no prepayment. Each contract permit-
ted prepayment without penalty. It was 
and continues to be plaintiffs contention 
that neither the distribution proposed on 
January 30 nor the subsequently ordered 
distribution is an equal distribution because 
of a sizeable difference between the totals 
of the then computed amounts representing 
principal and interest to be received in the 
absence of prepayment and assuming full 
and complete payment by the purchasers. 
The April hearing was concluded by the 
trial judge's request for submission of pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. The ex-wife's counsel presented his 
position in this regard by a May 6 letter to 
the court On May 29, Barrett and plaintiff 
conferred with respect to their proposed 
findings and conclusions; the meeting was 
discordant and resulted in a termination of 
their attorney-client relation. Seemingly 
using a draft prepared by Barrett, plaintiff 
prepared and submitted to the trial judge 
his proposed distribution. Plaintiff's May 
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The eviden- 31 transmittal letter to the judge referred 
to Barrett as his "former attorney" and the 
record in the case before us discloses with 
crystal clarity that from and after May 29 
plaintiff understood that Barrett and he 
had no relationship as attorney and client 
and conducted himself accordingly. 
On July 21, following receipt of the post-
hearing letter from the ex-wife's counsel 
and plaintiff's suggested findings and con-
clusions, the trial judge in the divorce case 
entered his order of itemized distribution of 
the subject real property interests, the con-
tracts; the judge promptly sent copies of 
the order to the ex-wife's counsel and to 
plaintiff personally; no copy was sent to 
Barrett and at no material time did he 
learn of the order. The ordered distribu-
tion was not and is not to plaintiff's liking; 
he views it as not substantially equal. 
Around the first of September, 1976, plain-
tiff conferred with and retained other coun-
sel. Their effort to appeal was unsuccess-
ful; the attempted appeal was dismissed by 
our Supreme Court as untimely. 
The theory of the present action, alleged 
in both negligence and contract is that Bar-
rett not only failed to prosecute an appeal 
but that he did not advise plaintiff of the 
requirement that an appeal must be com-
menced within thirty days following the 
entry of the order sought to be reviewed. 
Within his various arguments, plaintiff con-
tends that after May 29 Barrett had contin-
uing professional responsibility to plaintiff 
because there was no court approved with-
drawal of appearance by Barrett pursuant 
to Rule 117, 220 Kan. lx, and DR 2-
110(A)(1), 220 Kan. cxvi. 
[1] It makes no difference whether the 
action is said to be for negligence or breach 
of contract; causally related damage is an 
essential element of the claim. We affirm 
the trial court on this single dispositive 
point. 
[2] An actionable claim against an at-
torney for professional malpractice assert-v 
ing failure to prosecute an appeal or protect 
the client's rights to appeal from an unfa-
vorable judgment or order requires proof 
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that had a timely appeal been taken, a 
reversal or more favorable judgment would 
have resulted. Chicago Red Top Cab Ass'n 
v. Gaines, 49 Ill.App.3d 332, 333-334, 7 111. 
Dec. 167, 364 N.E.2d 328 (1977); C/M of 
Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Wood, 341 So.2d 1181, 
1182 (La.App.1976); Pusey v. Reed, 258 
A.2d 460, 461 (Del.Super.1969); Kilmer v. 
Carter, 2TI4 Cal.App.2d 81, 82, 87-88, 78 
Cal.Rptr. 800 (1969); Pete v. Henderson, 
124 Cal.App.2d 487, 491, 269 P.2d 78, 45 
A.L.R.2d 58 (1954); Bryant v. Seagraves, 
270 Or. 16, 18, 23, 526 P.2d 1027 (1974); 7 
AmJur.2dt Attorneys at Law, § 172; 45 
AJLIL2d 5, § 22. 
[3] Plaintiff's complaint is that the dis-
tribution of the contracts ordered in the 
divorce action constituted an abuse of judi-
cial discretion. Plaintiff's counsel correctly 
conceded at oral argument that the record 
fails to reflect a probability of appellate 
determination of abuse of discretion. Fur-
ther, review of the record compels the con-
clusion that no possibility of an appellate 
finding of abuse of discretion is shown. 
Without unnecessarily extending this opin-
ion by recitation of the particular facts, 
suffice it to say the distribution of the 
contracts proposed by plaintiff was an 
equal distribution; the ordered distribution 
was no less equal; and the ordered distribu-
tion is more favorable to plaintiff than his 
ex-wife for the reason that plaintiff has 
greater access to higher interest return dur-
ing a rising money market while each 
stands to lose equally during a falling mon-
ey market 
[4] We are mindful of the rules and 
principles applicable to appellate review of 
orders of summary judgment. They do not 
need to be recited again. There is no mate-
rial dispute as to the discussed controlling 
issue. Summary judgment was proper. 
Hiett v. Brier, 2 Kan.App.2d 610, 615, 586 
P.2d 55, rev. denied 225 Kan. 844 (1978). 
Affirmed. 
4 Kan App 2d 57 
George ALEXANDER, Appellant, 
v. 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL 
AND REHABILITATION SERVICES 
OF KANSAS, Appellee. 
No. 49979. 
Court of Appeals of Kansas. 
Nov. 16, 1979. 
Appeal was taken from an order of the 
Sumner District Court, Lloyd K. McDaniel, 
J., denying plaintiffs motion to restore his 
appeal from an adverse decision of the Ap-
peals Committee of the Department of So-
cial and Rehabilitation Services. The Court 
of Appeals, Swinehart, J., held that where 
plaintiff had dismissed his attorney of rec-
ord and notification of such dismissal had 
been given to the court and all other parties 
in the matter but no formal order of with-
drawal had been entered, failure to serve 
notice of further proceedings-in the-action 
upon the attorney of record was not error 
so long as the court ordered service upon 
the party himself. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Attorney and Client <s=>76(l) 
When a attorney of record has been 
terminated by his client and notification of 
such termination has been given to court 
and all other parties in matter but no for-
mal order of withdrawal has been entered, 
failure to serve notice of further proceed-
ings in the action upon attorney of record 
was not error so long as court ordered ser-
vice upon the party himself. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 5(b), K.S.A. 60-205(b). 
Syllabus by the Court 
When an attorney of record has been 
terminated by his client and notification of 
such termination has been given to the 
court and all other parties in the matter but 
GLIDDEN v. 1 
Cite as, Mass.App, 
criminal conduct had been manifest, as in 
Ocala Star-Banner Co. v Damron, 401 U.S 
295, 91 S Ct. 628, 28 L Ed.2d 57 (1971) (false 
publication that a candidate had been 
charged with perjury in Federal Court) and 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 91 
S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971) (character-
ization of a candidate as "a former small-
time bootlegger"), the New York Times test 
of actual malice (knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard of truth or falsity) would 
be applicable. Stone v. Essex County 
Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. at 863, 330 
N.E.2d 161. Although we need not reach 
the question of actual malice, we note with 
approval that the trial judge, in the memo-
randum of his decision to grant defendants' 
motions for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdicts, ruled on the basis of the evidence 
that the jury's finding of actual malice was 
not warranted. National Assn. of Govt. 
Employees, Inc. v. Central BdcsL Corp., 379 
Mass. at , Mass.Adv.Sh. (1979) at 2497, 
396 N.R2d 996 (1979). 
In view of our holding that the state-
ments made by Gilgun and published by the 
Woburn Daily Times were not defamatory 
falsehoods, it is not necessary for us to 
decide whether evidence of a statement al-
legedly made by the publisher of the Daily 
Times to the plaintiff was properly exclud-
ed. 
Judgments for the defendants affirmed. 
ERRANOVA 
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of three counts of conspiracy to violate G L c. 
30, § 39M (manner of awarding contracts for 
construction and materials). The convictions 
or any reference to them were not, however. 
Roger C. GLIDDEN et al.1 
v. 
Domenic S. TERRANOVA. 
Appeals Court of Massachusetts, 
Essex. 
Argued May 15, 1981. 
Decided Nov. 13, 1981. 
Clients appealed from a judgment of 
the Superior Court, Doerfer, J., which 
granted attorney's motion for directed ver-
dict in malpractice action. The Appeals 
Court, Essex County, Rose, J., held that 
whether attorney-client relationship exist-
ed, whether attorney's conduct violated the 
standard of reasonable care and diligence in 
representing clients in outstanding legal ac-
tion, and whether negligence of attorney in 
failing to defend underlying litigation was 
proximate cause of damages to clients, who 
had default judgment entered against them 
in the suit, were questions for jury. 
Judgment reversed. 
1. Attorney and Client &=> 129(2) 
Expert testimony is generally neces-
sary to establish standard care owed by 
attorney in particular circumstances and a 
defendant's alleged departure from it, be-
cause question whether attorney has exer-
cised sufficient legal care is one of fact for 
the jury; however, expert testimony is not 
essential where the claimed legal mal-
practice is so gross or obvious that laymen 
can rely on their common knowledge or 
experience to recognize or infer negligence 
from the facts. 
2. Attorney and Client &=> 129(3) 
Whether attorney-client relationship 
existed or whether attorney's conduct vio-
lated the standard of reasonable care and 
diligence in representing clients in out-
introduced in evidence and therefore this ques-
tion is not properly before us. 
1. E\el\n M Glidden 
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standing legal action was question for jury, 
despite the fact that no expert testimony 
was offered by clients. 
3. Attorney and Client <s=> 129(2) 
Where a party who was the plaintiff in 
a legal action sues his attorney for negli-
gence in the prosecution of that action, he 
must establish that he probably would have 
succeeded in the underlying litigation were 
it not for the attorney's negligence. 
4. Attorney and Client &=> 129(2) 
Where attorney is sued by a client for 
allegedly failing to defend that client's un-
derlying litigation, the attorney should bear 
the burden of proof that the client had no 
defense. 
5. Attorney and Client e=> 129(3) 
Whether negligence of attorney in fail-
ing to defend underlying litigation was a 
proximate cause of damages of clients, who 
had default judgment entered against them 
in the suit, was question for jury in subse-
quent malpractice action. 
Bertram W. Allen, Manchester, for plain-
tiffs. 
Stephen R. Duly, Andover, for defendant. 
Before BROWN, ROSE and DREBEN, 
ROSE, Justice. 
The plaintiffs Glidden, husband and wife, 
brought suit against the defendant Terra-
nova, an attorney, alleging several claims in 
tort and contract arising from the defend-
ant's representation of them in a prior legal 
proceeding. The plaintiffs had be$n sued in 
District Court by a real estate broker seek-
ing to recover a commission earned in the 
sale of the plaintiffs' home. They now 
contend that the defendant promised to 
represent them and remove the action to 
the Superior Court for a jury trial, and that 
the defendant's failure to do so resulted in 
default judgments and, in subsequent sup-
plementary proceedings, the arrest and im-
prisonment of Mr. Glidden fnr contempt in 
not paying the judgment. At th~ :riat be-
REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
low, the plaintiffs presented evidence to 
support their claim, after which the defend-
ant filed a motion for a .directed verdict. 
The issues argued on appeal are whether 
the Superior Court judge was justified in 
allowing the motion for a directed verdict 
on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff did not 
offer expert testimony to establish either 
an attorney-client relationship or that the 
defendant violated the standard of care 
owed by a lawyer to his client in these 
particular circumstances, and (2) the plain-
tiffs' evidence could not support a conclu-
sion tha t the defendant's inaction was a 
proximate cause of the damages alleged by 
the plaintiffs. We hold that the evidence 
was sufficient to require denial of the mo-
tion for a directed verdict and reverse the 
judgment of the Superior Court. 
f l j 1. An attorney owes his client an 
obligation to exercise a reasonable degree 
of care and skill in the performance of his 
legal duties. Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass. 
574 (1878). McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 
374, 115 N.E. 481 (1917). Because the ques-
tion whether an attorney has exercised suf-
ficient legal care is one of fact for the jury 
to decide, expert testimony is generally nec-
essary to establish the standard of care 
owed by an attorney in the particular cir-
cumstances and the defendant's alleged de-
parture from it. Nolan, Tort Law § 186, a t 
299 (1979). Barry, Legal Malpractice in 
Massachusetts, 63 Mass.L.Rev. 15, 17 (1978). 
However, expert testimony is not essential 
where the claimed legal malpractice is so 
gross or obvious that laymen can rely on 
their common knowledge or experience to 
recognize or infer negligence from the 
facts. See Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51, 
57 (1811) ("whenever an attorney disobeys 
the lawful instructions of his client, and a 
loss ensues, for that loss the attorney is 
responsible"); Varnum v. Martin, 15 Pick. 
440 (1834) (evidence found sufficient to sus-
tain a verdict against the attorney on the 
ground of negligence despite the apparent 
lack of expert testimony). The rule that 
expert testimony is not always required to 
prove leeal malpractice has been adopted in 
other jurisdictions, see, e. g., bright v. vl'j/-
GLI^BEX v. 
O;'- as. >!«.s<i.^*-.j 
lkin:< 47 Cal.App.3d S02. 121 Cal.Rptr. 1 ^ 
V1 *?** "0; CW,7n>* v. •'rrt-f.^yi(..-//?, oi h a w . z*>, 
595 P.2d 275 (1979); House v. MaJdo.v, 46 
Ill.App.3d 68, 4 Ill.Dec. 644, 360 N.E.2d 580 
(1977); Centra/ Cao Co. v. C/arA'e, 259 Md. 
542, 2-70 A.2d 662 (1970); Hill v. Okay 
Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 252 N.W.2d 107 
(1977); Olfe v. Gordon, 93 Wis.2d 173, 286 
N.W.2d 573 (1980), and is consistent with 
the approach followed in Massachusetts in 
the medical malpractice context. See Po-
lonsky v. Union Hosp., Mass.App. , 
, Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. (1981) 675, 677, 
418 N.E.2d 620 (1981), and cases cited 
therein. 
[2] The plaintiffs here testified that the 
defendant agreed to represent them in an 
outstanding legal action and that all legal 
papers relative to that action were deliv-
ered to the defendant. According to their 
testimony, the defendant promised to re-
move the action to the Superior Court for a 
jury trial and later informed the plaintiffs 
that he had removed the action. The plain-
tiffs further testified that they did nothing 
about the action in reliance on the defend-
ant 's representation that "everything is 
well in hand" and that he would "straighten 
the whole thing out." Actually, the defend-
ant neither filed an answer nor removed the 
action, a fact which came to the plaintiffs' 
attention only after default judgments 
were entered in the District Court. The 
evidence indicates that the defendant was 
notified in advance, yet failed to appear at 
both the supplementary process hearing and 
the contempt hearing which resulted in Mr. 
Glidden's arrest and imprisonment. Final-
ly, the plaintiffs testified that they tele-
phoned the defendant after Mr. Glidden 
was committed for contempt, at which time 
they were told by a secretary that the de-
fendant was in conference and could not be 
disturbed. According to their testimony, 
the sole response to the plaintiffs' request 
for legal assistance was a subsequent tele-
phone call from the defendant's secretary to 
Mrs. Glidden suggesting that they "raise 
bail" and seek other counsel. Viewed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Di-
Marzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 
510, 514, 306 N.E.2d 432 (1974), the evidence 
was such tha t expert testimony was not 
TERRAXOYA Mass. U 7 1 
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ciiont reiat«on>mp existed or whe the r the 
defendant's conduct violated the standard 
of reasonable care and diligence. Accord-
ingly, it was error for the court to allow the 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict on 
the ground that no expert testimony was 
offered. 
[3-5] 2. Where a party who was the 
plaintiff in a legal action sues his attorney 
for negligence in the prosecution of that 
action, he must establish that he probably 
would have succeeded in the underlying liti-
gation were it not for the attorney's negli-
gence. McLeJlan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. at 
378, 115 N.E. 481; Siano v. Martinelli, 
Mass.App. , Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. (1981) 
1678, 427 N.E.2d 489 (1981); Hurd v. 
DiMcnto & Sullivan, 440 F.2d 1322, 1323 
(1st Cir. 1971). However, there are no 
cases in Massachusetts which answer the 
question of where the burden of proof 
lies in a malpractice action when the 
defendant-attorney allegedly failed to de-
fend in the underlying litigation. The 
trial court in Salisbury v. Gourgas, 10 
Met. 442 (1845), following the rule in 
an early English case, Godefroy v. Jay, 
7 Bing. 413, 131 Eng.Rep. 159 (1831), 
imposed the burden on the attorney of 
proving that the client had no defense, but 
the propriety of this ruling was not ad-
dressed on appeal. We hold that the attor-
ney should indeed bear the burden of proof 
in such a case, for "since the client had no 
obligation 4to prove his case' in the underly-
ing action (he could have simply required 
the plaintiff to prove his case), he should 
not shoulder the burden of proving a de-
fense in the malpractice action." Nolan, 
Tort Law § 182 at 297. See Barry, Legal 
Malpractice in Massachusetts, 63 Mass.L. 
Rev. 15 at 17 n.31 ("to require the client to 
prove that the underlying action was defen-
sible requires him to establish in the mal-
practice suit that which he would not have 
been required to prove in the underlying 
action"). Because the plaintiffs in the 
present case did not have the burden of 
proving that they would have prevailed in 
the underlying litigation if the defendant 
had not been negligent, it was error for the 
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Superior Court judge to allow the defend-
ant's motion for a directed verdict on the 
ground that the plaintiffs did not prove the 
defendant's negligence to be a proximate 
cause of their damages. 
Judgment reversed. 
(Z | KEY NUMB^YSTEM^ 
COMMONWEALTH 
V. 
Larry MIMS. 
Appeals Court of Massachusetts, 
Suffolk. 
Argued Oct. 14, 1981. 
Decided Nov. 16, 1981. 
Further Appellate Review 
Denied Jan. 6, 1982. 
Defendant was convicted in Suffolk 
County on indictments charging armed rob-
bery and unlawful possession of a firearm 
in an automobile, and he appealed. The 
Appeals Court held that: (1) no substantial 
risk of miscarriage of justice arose from 
question asked of defense witness by trial 
judge, and (2) new trial was not required by 
^response of witness, on cross-examination 
by defendant, indicating that defendant 
had previously been an inmate. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>656(2) 
Neither unexceptional and neutral 
question asked of a defense witness by trial 
judge nor response given, without objection, 
gave rise to substantial risk of miscarriage 
of justice, especially in view of final in-
structions that jury were to attach no spe-
cial significance to any question judge may 
have aoked of witnesses. 
2. Criminal Law <3=>1I58(4) 
Trial judge's findings of fact made on 
rnot'on tn sunoress. supported bv the evi-
3. Criminal Law <$=> 1169.11 
Witness' response, on cross-examina-
tion by defense counsel, indicating that de-
fendant had previously been an inmate did 
not require new trial in view of the evi-
dence presented and the circumstances sur-
rounding the statement, which was not en-
tirely unresponsive, though instruction to 
disregard did not immediately follow the 
unfortunate response. 
Michael R. Pizziferri, Boston, for defend-
ant. 
Michael J. Traft, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the 
Commonwealth. 
Before ARMSTRONG, GREANEY and 
PERRETTA, JJ . 
RESCRIPT. 
The defendant appeals from convictions 
on indictments charging him with armed 
robbery, G.L. c. 265, § 17, and unlawful 
possession of a firearm in an automobile, 
G.L. c. 269, § 10(a), as amended through 
St.1975, c. 113, § 2. 
1. There is no necessity for us either to 
approve or disapprove the practice of allow-
ing jurors to submit questions to the judge 
to be put to a witness, as the question here 
in issue wras so insignificant and lacking in 
substance as to be innocuous. But see Peo-
ple v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 186-188, 200 
N.W.2d 73 (1972); State v. Taylor, 25 Ariz. 
App. 497, 499-500, 544 P.2d 714 (1976); 
Cheeks v. State, 266 Ind. 190, 195-196, 361 
N.E.2d 906 (1977). Compare State v. An-
derson, 108 Utah 130, 133-134, 158 P.2d 127 
(1945); State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 
345, 390, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955); Stinson v. 
State, 151 Ga.App. 533, 536-537, 260 S.E.2d 
407 (1979). 
[1] 2. The defendant made no objec-
tion when the judge asked a defense wit-
ness an unexceptional and neutral question. 
See Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419, 
423. 341 N.E.2d 276 (1976V Neither the 
BYRD v. MARTIN. HOPKINS. LEMON AND CARTER. l\(\ 142-' 
rate it charges its other municipal custom-
ers for wheeling power. 
16. The court does not find it necessary 
at this time to require the cities 10 furnish a 
bond. The court is satisfied that the cities 
are able to respond in damages if KG & E 
does suffer damages by reason of the in-
junction. See Continental Oil Co. v. Fron-
tier Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782-83 (10th 
Cir.1964). 
This memorandum is the basis for the 
order entered on May 27, 1983, in which the 
court granted plaintiffs' motion for prelimi-
nary injunction, and ordered KG & E to 
wheel the cities their current entitlements 
to power generated by the Southwestern 
Power Administration and Nearman Creek 
at the prevailing rate it charges other mu-
nicipalities for its wheeling services, such 
rate being subject to approval by the Feder-
al Energy Regulatory Commission. The or-
der further provides that it is unnecessary 
at this time for the cities to furnish a bond. 
Dallas BYRD, Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARTIN, HOPKINS, LEMON AND 
CARTER, P.C., et al., Defendants. 
Civ. A. No. 81-0559-R. 
United States District Court, 
W.D. Virginia, 
Roanoke Division. 
June 1, 1983. 
Action was brought for legal mal-
practice. Defendants moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court, Turk, Chief 
Judge, held that under Virginia law, pur-
ported contract between county and builder 
of proposed shopping center to provide the 
complex with sewer service was ultra vires 
and void ab initio insofar as it purported to 
restrict discretionary authority to promote 
public health and that even if the contract 
did not restrict discretionary power it was 
unenforceable as beyond scope of county's 
power to construct sewage disposal systems. 
Motion granted. 
1. Attorney and Client <$=> 129(2) 
To recover against an attorney for neg-
ligence, a plaintiff must prove the attor-
ney's employment, his neglect of a reasona-
ble duty and that such negligence resulted 
in and was proximate cause of plaintiff's 
loss. 
2. Counties <s=> 124(1) 
Municipal Corporations <2=^ 247 
Virginia counties and cities cannot be 
bound by a contract which is beyond the 
scope of their powers and such ultra vires 
contracts are void ab initio. 
3. Municipal Corporations o=>724 
Although a Virginia municipal corpora-
tion acts in a proprietary capacity when it 
operates or maintains a sewer, it acts in a 
governmental capacity and exercises discre-
tionary functions when selecting and adopt-
ing a plan for construction of a sewage 
disposal system. Va.Code 1950, § 15.1-320. 
4. Municipal Corporations <$=>62, 247 
Units of Virginia local government 
cannot by contract or otherwise barter 
away or surrender their essential legislative 
or police powers and contracts which im-
pinge on those essential governmental pow-
ers are void. 
5. Counties <s=>124(l) 
Although a Virginia county has power 
to construct sewer systems, if it enters into 
a contract which restricts exercise of that 
discretionary legislative function, such con-
tract is ultra vires and void ab initio. Va. 
Code 1950, § 15.1-320. 
6. Counties e=>124(l) 
Under Virginia law, purported contract 
between county and builder of proposed 
shopping center to provide sewer services 
was ultra vires and void ab initio insofar as 
it purported to restrict discretionary au-
thority to promote public health and was 
also ultra vires as an attempt to obligate 
county to construct the sewer system even 
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if the project was not approved by the 
State Water Control Board, as required by 
statute, or if county could not obtain voter 
approval to issue bonds and even if contract 
did not restrict discretionary power it was 
unenforceable as beyond scope of county's 
power to construct sewage disposal systems. 
Va.Code 1950, §§ 15.1-320, 15.1-322 to 15.-
1-324. 
7. Attorney and Client e=> 129(4) 
Alleged negligence of counsel in bring-
ing breach of contract action, which was 
dismissed apparently on limitations 
grounds, could not have been proximate 
cause of client's failure to recover damages 
for county's alleged breach of contract to 
construct sewer system to serve client's 
shopping center where, under state law, any 
such contract would be ultra vires and void 
ab initio. 
Fergus B. Norton, Roanoke, Va., for 
plaintiff. 
George W. Wooten, Wm. B. Poff, Woods, 
Rogers, Muse, Walker & Thornton, Roa-
noke, Va., for defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
TURK, Chief Judge. 
Dallas Byrd (Byrd) brought this action 
for legal malpractice against Martin, Hop-
kins, Lemon and Carter, P.C., (MHL & C), 
William L. Martin, Osterhoudt, Ferguson, 
Natt and Aheron, P.C, (OFN & A), Charles 
H. Osterhoudt, Michael S. Ferguson, Ed-
ward A. Natt and Michael J. Aheron. Jur-
isdiction vests in this court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). This action is now be-
fore the court on the defendants' motions 
for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56. 
Byrd's legal malpractice action arises out 
of the following facts. In 1972, Byrd 
owned land in Botetourt County, Virginia, 
on which he wished to construct a shopping 
center. In M .^rch 1972, he ro^v«*w.i bis 
intention to build a shopping center t<> the 
Botetourt County Board of Supervisors 
(Board;. Specifically, by letter dated 
ter. . . . Before leasing commitments can 
be made and actual construction begun it is 
imperative that this area "be served with 
public sewer service. Therefore, I request 
you to consider serving this area with a 
public sewer system in the immediate fu-
ture." (Byrd Dep.Ex. 3). The Board re-
sponded by passing a resolution on March 
24, 1972, which stated that "this Board does 
hereby pledge its efforts and resources to 
provide this complex and the surrounding 
area with sewer service which service is 
further pledged to be available at the time 
of opening of the center." (Byrd Dep.Ex. 
Byrd next appeared before the Board on 
February 19, 1973, at which time he in-
formed the Board that he was ready to 
begin constructing the shopping center but 
that he first needed reassurance from the 
Board that sewer service would be available 
to the project by March 1974. At that time, 
the Board reaffirmed its commitment of 
1972 to provide sewer service to the shop-
ping center by March 1974. Byrd was noti-
fied of the Board's decision by a letter 
dated February 22, 1973. (Byrd Supp. 
Dep.Ex. 13 and 13A). Byrd contends that 
the March 14, 1972 letter to the Board, and 
the Board's February 22, 1973 letter to him 
constituted a written contract obligating 
him to build a shopping center in return for 
Botetourt County providing sewer service 
to the site of the proposed shopping center. 
Botetourt County subsequently began ex-
ploring various alternatives for providing 
sewer service to the area of the proposed 
shopping center. However, no sewer sys-
tem was ever provided to the area, and 
Byrd did not start construction of the pro-
posed shopping center. Byrd eventually de-
faulted on payments to a bank on various 
loans, and the bank sold the property in 
Botetourt County at public auction on July 
28, 1978. 
Byrd ih-n retained MHL & C to sue the 
county inv breach *>;' contract. On Febru-
ary 28, 1979, MHL & C filed suit against 
the county in state court. But a nonsuit 
-.v.-- I : ; ' - :> • \ '•.•:•.!»«»• ^ , ] ( *79 R w c ! 
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547 and -550. The Board disallowed Byrd's 
claim on December 17, 1979. 
Due to a conflict of interest, MHL & C 
subsequently referred Byrd to OFN £ A, 
whom Byrd contacted in January 19S0 con-
cerning his claim against the county. On 
March 7, 1980, OFN & A filed suit against 
the county for breach of contract. How-
ever, on August 15, 1980, this action was 
also nonsuited. Byrd then filed another 
claim with the Board on September 3, 1980. 
And on October 15, 1980, OFN & A filed a 
second lawsuit against the county for 
breach of contract. That action was dis-
missed by the state court on October 1, 
198L Byrd filed this action on December 
28, 1981, alleging that these defendants 
were negligent in handling his breach of 
contract claim against the county. 
On March 1, 1983, the OFN & A defend-
ants filed a motion for summary judgment 
on the grounds that their alleged negli-
gence could not have been the proximate 
cause of Byrd's damages in that the appli-
cable limitations period had expired on his 
breach of contract claim prior to his reten-
tion of these defendants as his counsel. On 
March 30, 1983, the MHL & C defendants 
filed a motion for summary judgment on 
the grounds that (1) the limitations period 
for Byrd's legal malpractice claim had ex-
pired; (2) the limitations period for Byrd's 
breach of contract claim had expired prior 
to his retention of these defendants; and 
(3) these defendants' alleged negligence was 
not the proximate cause of Byrd's damages 
because the negligence of OFN & A was 
the superseding intervening cause of his 
alleged injury. 
These motions came on for a hearing on 
April 6, 1983, and the court took them un-
der advisement pending the submission of a 
brief in opposition by Byrd's counsel. 
Thereafter, on May 20, 1983, the MHL & 
C defendants filed a supplemental motion 
for summary judgment on the grounds that 
their alleged negligence was not the proxi-
mate cause of Byrd's injury in that (1) there 
was never any contract between the Board 
and Byrd because there was no meeting of 
the minds or mutuality of obligation, and 
Tract w;b ultra vires and ihus unenforcea-
ble against the Board. 
On May 25, 1983, BynYs counsel filed a 
;>r:ef in oppuMl;on to MIIL ^ (. s lirst mo-
tion for summary judgment. On that same 
date, the court held a telephone conference 
call during which the parties gave argu-
ment in support of their respective posi-
tions, and the OFN & A defendants joined 
in MHL & C's supplemental motion for 
summary judgment. The court having con-
sidered the argument of counsel and the 
entire record, defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment are now ready for disposi-
tion. 
A motion for summary judgment should 
be granted only if there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The appropriate focus 
in this diversity action, of course, is whether 
the undisputed facts show that the defend-
ants are entitled to judgment under the law 
of Virginia. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, DS S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 
(1937). 
[1] To recover against an attorney for 
negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) the 
attorney's employment; (2) his neglect of a 
reasonable duty; and (3) that such negli-
gence resulted in and was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's loss. Maryland Cas-
ualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 401 (4th 
Cir.1916). Proof that the attorney was neg-
ligent is itself insufficient. *'[T]he extent 
of the damages sustained by the complain-
ant must be affirmatively shown; for the 
attorney is only liable for the actual injury 
his client has received. . . . " Allied Produc-
tions, Inc. v. Duesterdick, 217 Va. 763, 764, 
232 S.E.2d 774, 775 (1977). 
Byrd alleges that the defendants negli-
gently handled his breach of contract claim 
against Botetourt County and that OFN & 
A was negligent in failing to sue MHL & C 
for the latter's negligence in suing the 
county. Therefore, to recover against the 
defendants for negligence. Byrd must prove 
that they were negligent and that but for 
their negligence, he would have recovered 
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damages against Botetourt County for 
breach of contract. And if the undisputed 
facts reveal that any of these elements of 
proof are absent, the defendants will be 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The parties are in sharp dispute as to 
whether there was ever any contract 
formed between Byrd and the Board. The 
defendants argue that there was no meet-
ing of the minds and that the essential 
terms of the alleged contract were so uncer-
tain that they created no power of accept-
ance in the Board. The defendants further 
argue that the alleged contract lacked mu-
tuality of obligation because Byrd never 
promised to do anything in return for the 
county providing sewer service to his land. 
Byrd contends, however, that the letters 
exchanged between him and the Board both 
before and after February 19, 1973, consti-
tuted a "meeting of the minds," and that 
many of the absent terms were unforesee-
able at that time. And Byrd testified that 
he promised to build a shopping center in 
exchange for the county providing his land 
with sewer service. (Bvrd Supp.Dep. 39-40, 
81). 
Regardless of whether summary judg-
ment is appropriate on the basis that there 
was no contract, see Charbonnages De 
France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 
1979), assuming without deciding that a 
contract was formed between Byrd and the 
Board, the court concludes that the defend-
ants are entitled to summary judgment be-
cause their alleged negligence, as a matter 
of law, could not have proximately caused 
Byrd's alleged injury. 
[2] Counties and cities cannot be bound 
by a contract which is beyond the scope of 
their powers. Richard L. Deal and Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. , 
299 S.E.2d 346 (1983). And such ultra vires 
contracts are void ab initio, thereby allow-
ing a local governmental unit to set up as a 
defense its lack of power. Id. 
[31 Station 15.1--320 "f tho Co#!e of Vir-
ginia provides in part that "[f]or the pur-
pose of providing relief from pollution and 
for the improvement of conditions affecting 
To establish, construct . . . operate and 
maintain a sewage disposal system . . . , 
subject to the approval of the State Water 
Control Board." Although a municipal cor-
poration acts in a proprietary capacity when 
it operates or maintains a sewer, it acts in a 
governmental capacity and exercises discre-
tionary functions when selecting and adopt-
ing a plan for the construction of a sewage 
disposal system. Cf. Freeman v. City of 
Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 266 S.E.2d 885 (1980) 
(street maintenance is proprietary function 
but street design is governmental function). 
Byrd alleges that the Board promised to 
provide a sewage system to his proposed 
shopping center. The Board's determina-
tion of whether to build a sewer system was 
a governmental function which was subject 
to the Board's discretion. Consequently, 
the contract between Byrd and the Board 
concerned a governmental function and the 
exercise of legislative discretion. 
[4,5] The Supreme Court of Virginia 
has indicated that units of local government 
cannot by contract or otherwise barter 
away or surrender their essential legislative 
or police powers, and that contracts which 
impinge upon these essential governmental 
powers are void. See Mumpower v. Hous-
ing Authority of City of Bristol, 176 Va. 
426, 452, 11 SE.2d 732, 742-43 (1940) (hold-
ing inter alia that a provision in a contract 
whereby a city agreed to vacate and close 
streets selected for such by a housing au-
thority was invalid because the location of 
public ways was a legislative function, and 
the contract provision thus infringed upon 
the city's legislative and discretionary pow-
ers); cf. Va.Code § 15.1-19.5 (1981 Repl. 
Vol.) (officers of a local governmental unit 
may delegate powers and duties unless such 
requires the exercise of judgment for the 
public welfare). Thus, although a county 
has the power to construct sewer systems, if 
it enters into a contract which restricts the 
exercise of this discretionary legislative 
Uip.i'Lion, such contract is ultra vires and 
void ab initio. 
As indicated above, the subject of the 
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void. 
The court concludes that the contract 
purported to restrict the statutory authori-
ty granted the Board by Va.Code § 15.1— 
320 to determine whether it was in the 
public interest to construct a sewage dispos-
al system in the area of the proposed shop-
ping center. According to Byrd. the Board 
promised in the contract to "have the [sew-
er] service available by your contemplated 
opening date of March 1974." (Byrd 
Dep.Ex. 13). This contract thus hampered 
the discretion of future boards to determine 
if the public interest would best be served 
by constructing a sewer in that area. 
Moreover, the express terms of this con-
tract imposed an unconditional obligation 
upon Botetourt County to build a sewer 
system, regardless of whether the county 
could obtain suitable financial arrange-
ments. This absence of a condition that 
suitable financing be obtained further re-
stricted the Board's legislative discretion. 
See Mumpower, 176 Va. at 45, 11 S.E.2d at 
743. 
[6] The court therefore holds that the 
alleged contract to provide sewer services to 
Byrd's land purported to restrict the 
Board's discretionary authority to promote 
the public health. Thus, assuming that the 
contract was formed, it was ultra vires and 
void ab initio, and the Board would have 
been able to successfully plead its own lack 
of power in Byrd's breach of contract ac-
tion. Accord Rockingham Square Shopping 
Center, Inc. v. Town of Madison, 45 N.C. 
App. 249, 262 S.E.2d 705 (1980) (contract 
wherein a town promised to open road as 
inducement for corporation to build shop-
ping center was ultra vires and unenforcea-
ble against the town because it restricted 
the discretionary authority of the town's 
governing body). 
The contract was also ultra vires and thus 
void ah initio in that it attempted to obli-
gate the Board to construct a sewer system 
even if the project was not approved by the 
State Water Control Board, see Va.Code 
§ 15.1-320 (1981 Repl.Vol). or the county 
Thus, even if the contract did not restrict 
the Board's discretionary power, it was still 
unenforceable because it went beyond the 
scope of the county's power to construct 
sewage disposal systems. See Richard L. 
Deal and Associates, Inc., supra. 
[7] In light of these conclusions, the 
court holds that the defendants' alleged 
negligence could not have been the proxi-
mate cause of Byrd's failure to recover 
damages for the Board's alleged breach of 
contract. Accordingly, the defendants are 
entitled to summary judgment on Byrd's 
legal malpractice claims. This decision ren-
ders unnecessary a determination of the 
parties' other contentions. An appropriate 
order and judgment will be entered this 
dav. 
Carolyn F. FERGUSON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELE-
GRAPH COMPANY, Defendant. 
No. 82-0327-CV-W-l. 
United States District Court, 
W.D. Missouri, W.D. 
June 2, 1983. 
In a suit under the equal employment 
opportunity provisions of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and under the 1871 civil rights 
statute, the District Court, John W. Oliver, 
Senior District Judge, after trial by the 
court, held that, under evidence, there was 
no racial discrimination playing any part in 
denial of promotions or in suspension or 
ultimate termination of the plaintiff's em-
ployment, but, rather, the sole reason for 
her denial of promotions, her suspension 
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speedy trial were denied. Defendant was 58 A.D.2d 683 
thereafter convicted of assault in the Joseph GARGUILO, Appellant, 
second degree and this appeal ensued. 
[1] Defendant raises several contentions 
on this appeal. Initially defendant con-
tends that he was denied a speedy trial. A 
review of the record reveals that the Dis-
trict Attorney was at all times ready to 
proceed to trial, and that the delay of de-
fendant's trial was caused by his own ac-
tions and conduct. Consideration of the 
record in its entirety while weighing the 
relevant factors as outlined by the Court of 
Appeals in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 
442, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303 leads 
this court to the conclusion that defendant 
was not denied his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial. 
[2] Defendant also contends that his 
second trial should not have been held in 
that it placed him in double jeopardy. We 
disagree. His statements to the court prior 
to declaration of the mistrial clearly indi-
cated his unwillingness to proceed. Al-
though he did not specifically move for a 
mistrial, defendant's statements can only be 
looked upon as a request for such relief and 
no objection was made by defendant when 
the mistrial was declared. Consequently, 
we are of the view that the defense of 
double jeopardy is unavailing (Matter of 
Napoli v. Supreme Court of State of N. Y., 
40 A.D.2d 159, 338 N.Y.S.2d 721, affd., 33 
N.Y.2d 980, 353 N.Y.S.2d 740, 309 N.E.2d 
137, cert, den., 417 U.S. 947, 94 S.Ct. 3073, 
41 L.Ed.2d 668). 
We have carefully considered defendant's 
remaining arguments and find them unper-
suasive. Defendant's conviction, therefore, 
should not be disturbed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
Philip SCHUNK, Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Solomon Abrahams, Third-Party 
Defendant 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
Third Department. 
June 9, 1977. 
Appeal was taken from an order of the 
Supreme Court, Albany County, which 
granted a motion to dismiss a legal mal-
practice complaint. The Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, held that the complaint 
was properly dismissed for the plaintiff's 
failure to make a showing that a meritori-
ous defense had been available to him in the 
underlying litigation which gave rise to the 
malpractice charge. 
Affirmed. 
1. Attorney and Client <s=> 129(2) 
In an action for legal malpractice aris-
ing out of attorney's alleged negligent fail-
ure to answer or respond to complaint 
against client, client must show not only 
that the attorney was negligent but also 
that client would have been successful in 
the underlying action but for the attorney's 
negligence. 
2. Attorney and Client «=» 129(3) 
Legal malpractice complaint which was 
based on allegation that attorney had been 
negligent in neither answering nor other-
wise responding to complaint against client 
was properly dismissed where client failed 
to meet his burden of proving that a meri-
torious defense had been available to him in 
the underlying action. 
Solomon Abrahams, White Plains, for ap-
pellant. 
Hart & Hume, New York City (Duncan 
B. Hume, New York City, of counsel), for 
respondent. 
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Before KOREMAN, P. J., and GREEN-
BLOTT, SWEENEY, MAIN and LARKIN, 
JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
Appeal from an order of the Supreme 
Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered July 
28, 1976 in Albany County, which granted a 
motion by defendant at the close of the 
plaintiff's case to dismiss the complaint by 
reason of the failure of the plaintiff to 
make out a prima facie case. 
This action arises out of the alleged mal-
practice of the defendant, an attorney who 
was retained by the plaintiff, to defend an 
action brought against the plaintiff by Rob-
ert Kirkpatrick individually and on behalf 
of Ulster Erectors, Inc. On May 29, 1973 a 
default judgment was entered by Kirkpat-
rick against the plaintiff. In July, 1973 
the third-party defendant herein and the 
present counsel of the plaintiff made a mo-
tion to open the default judgment. That 
motion was "denied without prejudice to 
renew upon production of more specific evi-
dence that defendant has a meritorious de-
fense". Ten months later when another 
motion was made to vacate the default 
judgment, the motion was again denied on 
the ground that the plaintiff did not 
present a sufficient affidavit of merit. 
This action followed. 
It was found and is not disputed that 
defendant was negligent in neither answer-
ing nor otherwise responding to the com-
plaint against plaintiff in the Kirkpatrick 
action. 
[1,2] The trial court dismissed the ac-
tion on the ground that the plaintiff failed 
to make a showing that a meritorious de-
fense was available in the underlying Kirk-
pa tridc action. The decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed. It is settled law 
in New York that in an action against an 
attorney for alleged malpractice, the plain-
tiff must show not only that the defendant 
was negligent, but also that the plaintiff 
would have been successful in the underly-
ing action. This court recently reaffirmed 
this principle in Carpenter v. Weichert, 51 
A.D.2d 817, at page 818, 379 N.Y.S.2d 191, 
at page 193, where it said: 
In order for plaintiff to recover in this 
malpractice action, he must prove facts 
which would enable the jury to find that 
he would have recovered against [the 
defendant in the underlying action] but 
for his attorney's negligence (Gladden v. 
Logan> 28 A.D.2d 1116, 284 N.Y.S.2d 
920). 
Since the plaintiff failed to meet his bur-
den of proof and failed to prove a prima 
facie case, the dismissal of the complaint 
was proper. 
Order affirmed, without costs. 
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58 A.D.2d 672 
The PEOPLE of the State of New 
York, Respondent, 
v. 
Andrew Dale BLIM, Appellant 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
Third Department. 
June 9, 1977. 
Defendant was convicted in the County 
Court, Chemung County, of burglary in the 
third degree and petit larceny and was sen-
tenced to concurrent terms of three and 
one-half to seven years' imprisonment and 
one-year imprisonment. Defendant appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, held that (1) defendant was not enti-
tled to a second hearing on the voluntari-
ness of his confession, absent allegation 
that any new facts came to light after the 
first hearing which were not previously 
within the knowledge of the defendant; (2) 
defendant could be cross-examined regard-
ing prior burglaries committed by him, and 
(3) the sentence was not excessive. 
Affirmed. 
